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THESIS

SPAIN AND MOROCCO: THE SPANISH ENCLAVES IN NORTH
AFRICA, POTENTIAL MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY DILEMMA

by

Richard H. Porritt, Jr.

December 1982

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What is the nature of these Spanish enclaves today? Why do they continue to exist? What is their historical origin? What is the status of relations between Spain and Morocco? What are the superpower stakes in the region? How does one systematically look at enclave situations and similar territorial disputes in the 1980s, and in the recent past? Answers to these questions represent the focus of this study.

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Spain and Morocco: The Spanish Enclaves in North Africa,
Potential Mediterranean Security Dilemma

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Two Western Mediterranean/North African issues which receive a great deal of attention are the Gibraltar question between Spain and Britain, and the Western Sahara question between Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). With a significant change in either one of these issues, a more obscure regional issue is likely to surface and gain more publicity--the status of Spain's enclaves in North Africa. A settlement in the Sahara would allow Morocco to redirect its efforts to the Strait of Gibraltar area. Furthermore, King Hassan II of Morocco has said that a change in the status of Gibraltar will presage a change in the status of the Spanish enclaves. Spain's military historically has had a large stake in the enclaves, however, Spain's Socialists vowed even before the 1982 elections to keep the enclaves Spanish.

What is the nature of these Spanish enclaves today? Why do they continue to exist? What is their historical origin? What is the status of relations between Spain and Morocco? What are the superpower stakes in the region? How does one systematically look at enclave situations and similar territorial disputes in the 1980s, and in the recent past? Answers to these questions represent the focus of this study.

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
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


Map 1. World Map Showing Spain and Morocco.


(On opposite sides of the Strait of Gibraltar, midway between the U.S. East Coast and the Persian Gulf, astride North Atlantic shipping lanes.)



Map 2. Spain and Morocco



Map 3. Spain's Costa del Sol and Morocco's Riff Coast.



Map 4. Strait of Gibraltar. (Direction of Traffic, Relative Distances, Land Elevation in feet.)

I. BACKGROUND AND POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ENCLAVES

A. SETTING

During the past twelve centuries, Spain and North Africa periodically have shifted political boundaries, and such shifting has resulted today in a bizarre intermingling of North and South. The Strait of Gibraltar, which is less than eight nautical miles at its narrowest point, divides not only two continents, but also two vastly different cultures: the Western European culture of Spain, and the Eastern culture of Arab-African Morocco. In addition to their cultural differences, Spain and Morocco are different in terms of their economic and industrial development as well: Spain is a part of the bloc of developed, industrialized nations of the North; Morocco is one of the developing, Third World nations of the South.

Political domination, however, has transcended geographical boundaries. Between the years 1497 and 1848, Spain acquired two enclave cities and three garrison enclaves on the coast of North Africa. The combined area of these Spanish enclaves is 14 square miles. According to the Spaniards, this area, with over 100,000 Spanish citizens, represents a part of metropolitan Spain. Ceuta, the largest, most important, and closest enclave city to the Spanish mainland, has not been Moroccan for 567 years, while Melilla, the other enclave city, has been Spanish since 1497, 485 years.

The "enclaving" country, Morocco, has been concerned in varying degrees with making these cities and minor enclaves on its northern Riff Coast a part of Morocco. The differences between Spain and

Morocco's industrial, economic, and educational development continues to promote in Spain a syndrome referred to as the "Threat from the South". Without doubt, roots of the syndrome date back to seven centuries that the Moslems inhabited Iberia. Additionally, however, the fact remains that Spain fought in neither World War I nor World War II, and that the 20th century Spanish military heroes are almost entirely from the Riff Wars with the Arabs and Berbers of North Africa. Militarily speaking, the "Threat from the South" is a very real image based on historical recollection of the recent past.

Peaceful coexistence has been the norm in the enclaves since the end of the Riff Wars in 1926. There have been exceptions to peace, and as recently as 1975 the Spanish enclaves in North Africa caused significant tension between Spain and Morocco as a sidelight to the major issue of confrontation in the Spanish Sahara. Three letters from Morocco and two from Spain were sent to the United Nations, specifically addressing the issue of the enclaves. Spain declared that the Moroccan position was a threat to Spanish "territorial integrity", and a ten-ship flotilla was dispatched to "show the flag" in Ceuta and the other major enclave, the city of Melilla, 120 nautical miles east-southeast of Ceuta [Ref. 1].

Tensions continued as four terrorist-style bombings occurred in the enclaves, some of which resulted in deaths and injuries. A number of Moroccans were expelled from Ceuta. In July 1975, Spanish tanks and troops faced Moroccan troops at the Melilla border. The incident started over the demolition of a structure that impeded construction of a frontier fence. At the U.N., accusations were made of Spanish persecution

of Moroccans in Ceuta. Later in the year, with the resolution of the Saharan question in November 1975, King Hassan II declared that the return of Ceuta and Melilla would not become a major issue until Gibraltar was returned to Spain. He did not feel it was wise for one country ". . . to dominate both sides of the entry to the Mediterranean", [Ref. 2].

According to Morocco: A Country Study, in 1977 Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta, ". . . leader of the irrendentist-oriented Istiqlal, emphasized Morocco's patience and flexibility on the enclave issue", [Ref. 3]. In 1979, bomb incidents occurred in both Ceuta and Melilla with Moroccan patriotic organizations assuming credit. At a 1981 news conference, King Hassan II said that Morocco must once and for all say that Ceuta and Melilla are Moroccan as they always have been.

B. THE EVENTS OF THE EARLY 1980s

Whether or not Hassan's statements regarding the linkage between Gibraltar and the Spanish enclaves are rhetorical, the first major changes in the area in over a decade began to occur in early 1982. A scenario for potential conflict of interest began to unfold which could have involved two U.S. friends: Spain, a NATO ally; and Morocco, a close friend of the U.S. The series of events were as follows:

1. In 1980-81, Britain for the first time officially presented to the members of Parliament the Spanish point of view regarding Gibraltar. Up until that time, only the British and Gibraltarian positions had been "fairly" represented, according to the Spaniards. Spain's application for NATO entry was sent to Brussels during late 1981, and was linked to the activity as well. [Ref. 4]

2. Spain considered the Parliamentary presentation to be a positive development which grew out of British-Spanish negotiations that were being conducted in Lisbon regarding the Gibraltar question. For its part, Spain announced in January 1982 that it would end the land blockade of the border between Gibraltar and Spain on 20 April 1982. Spain had closed the border nearly 13 years earlier, in 1969. New optimism and speculation grew in Spain about the return of Gibraltar.

3. King Hassan reiterated at a news conference that if Gibraltar was returned to Spain, he would demand that Spain relinquish to Morocco its Places of Sovereignty in North Africa. The linkage to Gibraltar is a convenient one, as Ceuta is situated across the Strait in near mirror-image to Gibraltar. [Ref. 5]

C. CONTRIBUTORY CIRCUMSTANCES

In early 1982, other circumstances which exacerbated the Strait situation were:

1. Increased arms sales to Morocco from the U.S., paid for in large part by Saudi Arabia;
2. Continuing stalemate in the six-year old war with the Polisario in Western Sahara;*

*Morocco has been fighting a war against guerilla forces in the western Sahara since 1976. At that time, Morocco annexed the major part of the former Spanish colony of Spanish Sahara. The Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of Sagua al Hamra and Rio de Oro) guerillas are backed by Colonel Qaddafi of Libya and by Algeria. The shadow government of the Polisario is the SADR (Saharan Arab Democratic Republic). A dispute over the seating of the SADR at the OAU (Organization of African Unity) has threatened the organization's unity. [Ref. 6].

3. Increasingly disenchanted Moroccan populace who had seen a war which began with popular support turn sour in stalemate as 40 percent of the national budget was apportioned for defense [Ref. 7];

4. Increasing military buildup in Morocco where the armed forces have grown from 60,000 in 1975 to more than 120,000 in 1982, and continues to grow;

5. Failed crops in Morocco for three consecutive years;

6. In Spain, a government and country that was in the process of watching the trials of the conspirators in the military coup attempt that occurred less than one year prior, in February 1981;

7. Increasing popularity of the Spanish Socialist Party;

8. On the other side of the Spanish political spectrum, the existence of a group of politically minded right-wing military officers in the Spanish Army who retained a large political input;

9. The fact that the politically powerful generals and colonels of the Army had spent much of their early careers in the Protectorate of Spanish Morocco, or in the Spanish enclaves in North Africa, grappling with the problem of their defense--the only traditional major external defense problem that Spain has faced in the 20th century, namely, the "Threat from the South".

The above circumstances hypothetically could have caused the following chain of events to occur:

1. Britain's return of Gibraltar to Spain after Spain's entry into NATO;

2. Return of Ceuta and Melilla under the U.N. resolution on Decolonization in response to King Hassan II's demands [Ref. 8.].

3. The vow of Spanish Socialists and senior military to keep the North African enclaves Spanish. Although they are unlikely political partners, they are vocally united by nationalism and the issue of the territorial sovereignty of the enclaves.

4. The potential of the return of the enclaves as a unifying issue in Morocco, in the face of internal problems, causes the King to press the irredentist claims which have proven to be an effective tool to promote national unity in Morocco's recent past;

5. Heightening of tensions occurs ranging from diplomatic debate, to border incidents, to civilian marches on the enclaves (similar to the Green March on Sahara in 1975), to blockade (similar to that imposed by Spain on Gibraltar), or to a brushfire war (similar to the Falklands War). The location would be at the busy Strait of Gibraltar rather than the isolated South Atlantic.

Although the likelihood of the above hypothetical situation seems remote, it is similar in many of the latter aspects to events which occurred in the region in 1975, and since. The cooling of the 1975 enclaves tensions came only after Spain conceded the Sahara.

D. 1975 AND 1982-83: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

How are the Strait situations of today and of 1975 similar; how are they different? Spain still supports the status quo. The King of Morocco brings up the issue to exert pressure on Spain on this or any other issue where he deems it useful. In 1975, Moroccan leaders took advantage of the political climate in Spain where terminally ill Franco put Spain in a leadership succession situation it had not seen in 40 years.

The political situation in Spain in 1982 is not that critical. However, in light of the 1981 coup attempt, and continuing rumors of military conspiracy and arrests, moving up the national election to Fall 1982 (required by the crumbling of the ruling center coalition majority) and the rise of the Socialist Party in Spain, the 1982-83 period can be looked upon as a significant crossroads as Spain strives to complete its first decade as a democracy.

A misreading by King Hassan and the Government of Morocco of the political climate north of the Strait could be a serious blow to Spain's democratic growth. Any lack of resolve displayed by Spain regarding the position on the enclaves could be interpreted as a sign of weakness, which might invite the historically irredentist Moroccans to act. The fact that Spain's accession to NATO did not include the North African enclaves under the NATO umbrella is not looked upon favorably either by the Spanish Socialists, or by the Spanish military which is charged with their defense. The NATO exclusion sends a signal to the Soviets in regard to a lack of understanding of Spanish sensitivities about the enclaves within NATO. The exclusion is another area for the Soviets to exploit to undermine Alliance cohesion.

Differences which exist between 1975 and 1982-83 are many:

1. The strong personal friendship between King Hassan II and King Juan Carlos has helped considerably to resolve some of the differences between the two countries, and to build up areas of cooperation;
2. The growth of the Moroccan military is a major difference. The size of the armed forces has doubled, and continues to grow; this could contribute to future tensions;

3. The special relationship between Morocco and the United States has become closer.

4. The King and his government have continued to portray Morocco as a moderate Arab country that can act as an arbitor in many disputes. The Fez Conference in September 1982 was a Moroccan move toward continued leadership of Arab solidarity. In that case, a PLO homeland was the issue. It also was Morocco and King Hassan that helped to set up early meetings to arrange for Sadat's trip to Israel in 1977.

5. On the other hand, the 1975 situation came shortly after two assassination attempts on King Hassan by the military. It also occurred shortly after the Moroccans sent 3,000 troops, via Soviet ships, to reinforce Syria in the October 1973 War. Morocco has indeed become more moderate, and the King has solidified his position internally.

Differences within Spain between 1982-83 and 1975 include its transition to democracy, its NATO membership, and its continued attempts to depoliticize the military, especially the Army. A major difference in Spain from the 1975 period is the rise of the Socialists.

Morocco may perceive the Spanish military as ineffective, immobile, and disunited. A Spanish military, in disarray over its reorganization for NATO, and plagued with continued disclosures and arrests of officers involved in coup plots would offer less resistance to Moroccan advances. In The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean, Jesse Lewis, Jr. has stated that while King Hassan is in power, such a move seems unlikely. But he says, ". . . another Moroccan Government might take a radically different attitude, particularly a regime headed by persons of the same orientation as the young officers who ousted King Idris of Libya in 1969". [Ref. 9].

E. THE IMPACT OF THE FALKLANDS ON THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR

The Falkland's crisis, and the actions of the British, have done a number of things to affect the Gibraltar Strait situation. The invasion of the Falklands by Argentina in early April 1982 occurred just weeks before the Gibraltar frontier was to open. During the weeks that followed, two U.S. allies--Argentina, a U.S. Latin American ally who had taken on a special relationship with the U.S. regarding El Salvador, and Great Britain, a U.S. NATO ally--became embroiled in a territorial dispute in the South Atlantic.

Spain postponed the opening of the Gibraltar frontier from 20 April 1982 until 20 June 1982 in hopes that the crisis would be settled. Spain wanted Britain's full attention for the Gibraltar negotiations after the scheduled border opening. The opening would have been the first major concession in over 13 years. The opening did not occur. It then was postponed indefinitely when the Falkland's crisis continued.* The month of June 1982 corresponded with the final British push into Stanley, rather than an historic reopening of the Gibraltar border by Spain.


At the present time, Spain generally supports the status quo regarding its possession of the enclaves, although there have been some Spanish concessions such as the Moroccan use of Melilla. On the other hand, Morocco desires the return of the enclaves under the U.N. resolution regarding decolonization. King Hassan does not hesitate to raise the issue when it suits him to gain leverage on Spain, or any of a number of other issues. He also must bring up the enclave issue periodically to satisfy the irredentist elements in Morocco.

*The Gibraltar frontier opened to limited traffic on 15 December 1982.

Regional stability in the Western Mediterranean, and specifically good relations between Spain and Morocco, are of great interest to all who use the Strait. Passage of shipping through the Strait is significant for all Mediterranean littoral countries. Estimates of the number of commercial ships that pass Gibraltar each year range widely from 51,000 to 87,000.

The French and Soviets depend largely upon the Strait to link their Mediterranean and Atlantic fleets. The U.S. Sixth Fleet uses the Strait for entry and exit of its ships and submarines in transit to and from the U.S. East Coast.

The location of the enclaves (at and near the strategically important Strait of Gibraltar) can be considered in Clausewitzian terms as being at a "decisive point". The enclaves would be a source of potential conflict between Spain and Morocco should appropriate conditions develop in the area. The enclaves represent a constant obstacle that effects greater cooperation and better relations between the two countries.



Map 5. Spain and Morocco at the Strait of Gibraltar and Alboran Sea with Enclaves (Detail).

(Arrows Denote Enclaves)

II. THE ENCLAVES

A. GENERAL

The five Spanish enclaves in North Africa officially are called "The Places of Sovereignty in North Africa" (Las Plazas de Soberania del Norte de Africa). Occasionally they are referred to as "presidios", meaning garrison, fortress, or prison. Only three of the five truly fit that description, which really is a term from the past. Today the three minor enclaves (plazas menores) truly are just that, i.e., military garrisons and nothing more. The major enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, are fairly significant metropolitan port cities with about 60,000 people in each. In addition to the large civilian populace in both Ceuta and Melilla, there are large garrisons of soldiers.

All the enclaves are situated between 35 and 36 degrees north latitude. This places them roughly on the same latitude as Cape Hatteras, Memphis, Albuquerque, and San Luis Obispo in the United States; and Malta, Crete, Cyprus, Tehran, Kabul, Pusan and Tokyo in Europe and Asia. All of the enclaves are located on the Mediterranean side of the Strait of Gibraltar, and are within the area known as the Alboran Basin.

The five enclaves consist of two large cities, one island, one former island now connected to mainland Africa by a low sand beach, and one small island group. Ceuta and Melilla are the cities; Peñon de Velez de la Gomera is the former island which by accretion has been connected to mainland Africa. Alhucemas is the single island which is located in a bay which has the same name (Bay of Alhucemas, also called Bay of Ajdir by the Moroccans). There is a Moroccan city called Al Hoceima

(population 25,000) which is located on the western side of the bay.

Finally, an island group called the Chafarinas Islands consists of three small islands.

The city of Ceuta (population 64,567) is directly across the Strait of Gibraltar, twelve nautical miles south of the Rock. Mount Hacho, a 636 foot high mountain on the eastern extreme end of the cape, one mile east of center-city Ceuta, and Gibraltar (elevation 1398 feet), constitute the "Pillars of Hercules" of antiquity.

Sixty-five nautical miles by sea on the Moroccan coast from the Strait and Ceuta lies the small island of Peñon de Velez de la Gomera, now a cape due to its sand isthmus connection.* A castle fortress dominates the island. There are some minor structures that once comprised a small village. The island is solely a garrison today; all the inhabitants are military members except for a few civilians. Some work for the military at such jobs as boat mechanics; others are dependents of the commissioned and noncommissioned officers serving there.**

*Early maps, dating back to the German editions of the Ortelius Atlas from 1572 to 1602, clearly show the Peñon de Velez as a large rock island separated from the coast. A civilian boat mechanic who had worked for the Spanish Navy for over 20 years told me that the beach area had developed naturally by the action of the tides. One source says that the sand which has built up is the result of ". . . the debris that fell into the sea from the construction of a coastal road (which has) accumulated in a bulge that now connects the Peñon to the continent." Rezette, p. 67.

**While at anchor off Velez aboard the Ceuta-based ferry that serves the enclaves, I observed two children, a boy and a girl, aboard the small resupply boat. I believe they were the children of the lieutenant that was head of the Navy detachment on Velez. Additionally, two women, both in their late teens or early twenties, came off the island onto the ferry for transport to Ceuta. One was the wife of a young Spanish Sergeant who had just finished duty on Velez; the other probably was her sister. A young sailor, a native of the Canaries, had just finished duty on Velez. He said that often there were families there either to

Continuing east 30 nautical miles by sea, Alhucemas Island (also called Isla Alhucemas or Peñon de Alhucemas) lies less than one mile off shore in the Bay of Alhucemas, which is also called the Bay of Ajdir. By sea, 60 nautical miles east of Alhucemas on the eastern side of a large cape called Cabo de Tres Forcas (Three Forks Cape), which juts 15 miles out from the coast, is the city of Melilla (population 53,591).

Twenty-five nautical miles east of Melilla are the Chafarinas Islands (also spelled Zafarine and Chaffarinas). This is a group of three small islands about two miles offshore and 12 nautical miles east of Morocco's border with Algeria. Congresso, the westernmost island, is the largest, covering about 1/5 of a square mile (128 acres). It is about 230 feet high, based on the contour lines on the large scale map which appears in the Rezette book [Ref. 10]. It is uninhabited except for lookout posts [Ref. 11]. The center island, Isabel II, is just over one mile around. The garrison is likely quartered where there used to be a village with a population of about 500. The easternmost and smallest island is El Rey, used in the past as a cemetery by the residents of Isabell II [Ref. 12].

visit or to stay for the length of the individual officer's or noncommissioned officer's tour of duty. The availability of accomodations for such families is not known. Possibly they stay in the structures that once made up the village. One fishing boat of unknown nationality was anchored close to the sand isthmus, possibly indicating the presence of permanent fishermen in residence there or on the coast in Morocco. The presence of Spanish civilians and families on the island would add a different dimension to the garrison enclaves if ever there were heightened tensions in the area. The Spaniards must feel fairly secure on the outposts to bring the civilian families there.

Because of the ruggedness of the coast, the easiest way to connect one end of the Riff Coast with the other is by sea. The port of Ceuta on the eastern extreme connects easily with the port of Melilla on the western extreme. A ferry goes between the enclaves weekly making one eastern run from Ceuta to Melilla (Monday/Tuesday) and one western return (Thursday/Friday).

Land connection of the rugged Riff Coast is by Morocco's route P-39. The road runs from Ceuta via Tetouan and Chechaouen to Al Hoceima--a distance of 190 miles. Much of it is winding mountain road, so a trip by car takes about nine hours. From Al Hoceima, Morocco's P-39 route runs east via Nador to Melilla, a distance of 114 miles. By car, the connection takes about three hours.

Currently, although Morocco P-39 is considered a "good" road by Fodor's North Africa [Ref. 13], there are no legal provisions for getting from the Moroccan coast to the Spanish garrisons at Velez, Alhucemas, or Chafarinas. The only connection for these minor enclaves is by the Ceuta-Melilla ferry. Disembarking at these garrisons is by official permission only, since they are military outposts.

By air, the Riff Coast of Morocco is connected with the rest of Morocco by the 7,000 foot runway at Al Hoceima. Flights connect to Casablanca, Tetouan, and Rabat.* During the summer tourist season

*Al Hoceima/Cote du Rif airport is a Moroccan civil aerodrome. Its elevation is 89 feet and it has 7,100 feet of hard surfaced runway. No runway lights are indicated. It is equipped with a VHF omnidirectional range (VOR) system and a low frequency nondirectional radio beacon, according to the DOD Enroute Supplement for Europe, North Africa, and Mideast [Ref. 14]. Fodor's North Africa indicates that in season there are weekly flights by Air France from Paris to Al Hoceima [Ref. 15].

there are two flights per week that connect Al Hoceima's Cote du Rif airport with Tetuan, 75 nautical miles west. During the winter there is a single flight weekly connecting Al Hoceima with Tetuan. Tetuan is 24 miles south of Ceuta. Melilla has a 3,000 foot runway. Normal service for Melilla airport is approximately five flights daily to Malaga. Nador, south of Melilla is shown on charts of the 1960's to have an airport, however, its small runway is now inactive. Some older charts also show a seaplane base located in the small bay between Melilla and Nador. Ceuta has no air facilities presently, although a military heliport is planned, with possible expansion for civilian use [Ref. 16]. Tangier has a 9,000 foot runway and connecting flights to Casablanca, Madrid, Malaga, and Paris.

The Riff Coast is oriented topographically in near mirror-image to the Spanish Costa del Sol. As one looks at the two coasts and the areas inland, for approximately 50 nautical miles the similarity of the terrain and physical features is apparent. First, there are the similarities of the major rock capes with fortresses at Gibraltar and Mount Hacho. Moving east along the coast from the Strait, the shorelines open north and south almost symmetrically to form the Alboran Sea.

From the Strait inland to the northeast there are the Sierra Bermeja and Sierra de Yequas mountain ranges which join the even higher peaks of the Sierra Nevada mountains that continue to run in an easterly direction. In similar fashion on the Moroccan side, the rugged Riff mountain range starts at the Strait and goes southeast and then east.

Inland, 100 miles north from the Costa del Sol, a major river, the Guadalquivir, has its headwaters and flows between the Sierra Morena mountains on the north and a smaller range of mountains on the south.

The river flows into a wide, fertile valley, and into the Atlantic north of Cadiz. The smaller Guadalete River flows from the foothills into the Atlantic abeam Cadiz.

In similar fashion in Morocco, the small Loukkos River flows from the Riff foothills into the Atlantic near Larache. The larger Sebou River flows from its headwaters some 100 nm inland from the Riff Coast between the Riff Mountains and the Mid Atlas range. It then flows through a wide, fertile valley into the Atlantic near Kenitra, 20 miles north of Rabat-Sale.

This combination of general topographic similarity is striking: similar Strait frontage, coastline progressions eastward, mountain ranges and their orientations, the major rivers and river valleys.

Just as there are major similarities, however, there also are major differences. When one looks in a mirror, the image looks almost identical. But closer observation reveals certain things that are not quite the same. For example, as one touches one's right ear, the image in the mirror is touching its left.* The two coasts have subtle differences such as those associated with mirror images. The Riff Coast, for example, is extremely rugged from southeast of Tetouan all the way to Alhucemas Bay. The valley area surrounding the bay, immediately returns to rugged coast after Cape Tres Forcas in the Melilla and Nador areas. This ruggedness has made a coastal highway system nearly impossible (See Photo 1.) In Spain, however, the Costa del Sol, although rugged in spots, is endowed with at least a narrow strip of almost uninterrupted

*Discussion of the similarities and differences of mirror images is based on material included in lectures by Professor F. H. S. Stolfi at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 1981.

flat shoreline stretching from north of Gibraltar to west of Malaga. Even then a winding coastal road continues from Malaga to Nerja, Motril, and Almeria, connecting the various stretches of beach.

The Riff Coast of northern Morocco also is apparently more prone to fog than the Costa del Sol of southern Spain. A satellite photograph of the entire Gibraltar Strait/Alboran Basin/Atlantic Coast area showed at one point a fog-shrouded Riff Coast from Ceuta to Cape Tres Forcas. The fog began at the Riff Mountains and moved out in a band some 30 miles wide. In the same photo, the Costa del Sol, the Strait and the Atlantic coasts of Spain and Morocco were completely clear. While this may have been an isolated observation, the likelihood of fog as a problem was corroborated by discussions with a young Spanish sailor who had just completed a six month tour of duty on Velez from March to September 1982.* He said that often it was so clear that he could see the Sierra Nevadas of southern Spain 120 nautical miles away. I personally was able to observe this periodic excellent visibility. But, he added, at times for three days a week the fog was so thick he could hardly see his hand at arms length. Fog as a problem is documented in Alhucemas as well [Ref. 17].

Therefore, with all their general natural similarities, the Riff Coast differs from the Costa del Sol in two major ways--extremely rugged coastline and coastal terrain with no long stretches of beach, and a tendency toward heavy fog. Both of these factors would inhibit resort growth

*The reason for the long tour of duty on Velez was because he continued to volunteer to stay on at the garrison. He said it was like a vacation here, and an excellent way to spend one's enlistment.




Photo 1. Coastal Terrain Typical of Riff Coast
(Between Cape Tres Forcas and to Cape Noir South of Ceuta.)

and development potential of the type that has occurred on the Costa del Sol.

The enclaves are dispersed over 150 nautical miles from the Strait to just west of the Algerian border. A similar comparative air distance in the United States is from Baltimore to New York City, Chicago to Springfield, or San Francisco to Morro Bay. At the closest point, Ceuta is only 10 nautical miles from mainland Spain. Ten nautical miles is about the distance across San Francisco Bay from Berkeley to the Golden Gate Bridge, or the distance from Rapid City to Mount Rushmore, or across the opening of Chesapeake Bay from Cape Henry to the Delmarva Peninsula. The Chafarinas Islands are the farthest enclave from the Spanish mainland at a distance of 90 nautical miles. A comparative distance is from San Francisco to Point Sur, Los Angeles to San Diego, or Baltimore to Philadelphia.

The total area of the enclaves is 14 square miles. By comparison, Gibraltar is only 2.4 square miles. Ceuta is about nine square miles. Melilla is four square miles. The others are less than one square mile total.

Climatically, Ceuta and the rest of the enclaves are Mediterranean subtropical, characterized by a mild climate with summer drought and winter rain [Ref. 18]. Rainfall figures for Ceuta and Melilla are not available, however, Gibraltar averages 35.5 inches per year. The figures for Gibraltar and Ceuta probably are similar due to their close proximity. Rainfall at Gibraltar is nearly twice that of other coastal cities within 50 nm of the Strait. Cadiz on the Atlantic averages 18.5 inches, and Malaga averages 19 inches [Ref. 19]. This phenomena is ". . . due mainly to the easy passage through the straits

of depression, which gives rise to heavy winter rain, although there are three months of drought in the summer." [Ref. 20]. As the weather systems pass from east to west, they are likely funnelled by the high mountains in Spain and Morocco through the Strait.

B. CEUTA

1. Geography and Natural Resources

If one thinks of Gibraltar as having a north/south orientation, then the cape which Ceuta occupies is oriented east/west. There are at least three fairly distinct areas in Ceuta. Mount Hacho is the farthest east with a lighthouse and an old fortress surrounded by a wall. It is almost entirely for military use, although public roads do go through and around the military areas. Mount Hacho has been heavily tunneled according to a taxi driver. (Similar tunnels have been dug in Gibraltar for underground facilities, such as a hospital, ammunition storage, and an elaborate cistern.)


The commercial city of Ceuta and its port facility are located on the narrow isthmus which attaches Mount Hacho to mainland Africa. Apartment buildings, shops, hotels, and parks are located here. The appearance of the city is that of any Andalusian city of comparable size. The port is on the north side of the isthmus facing the Strait of Gibraltar. The Rock of Gibraltar, and the mountains north of Tarifa and Algeciras, Spain, are almost always visible from Ceuta.* The

*It is my observation that this near constant visual contact with peninsular Spain, coupled with its location on a point of land with a wide frontier gives Ceuta a feeling of security that one does not necessarily sense in Melilla. On the other extreme, Melilla has virtually no view of even the mountains of peninsular Spain, and is half-surrounded by Morocco with towering Mt. Gurugu in the distance. From this mountain, many assaults were launched against the city by the Berbers.



Map 6. Strait of Gibraltar Between Gibraltar and Ceuta (Detail).

Source: MAPA TURISTICO: Costa de la Luz, Firestone Hispania (T-30)



Map 7. Ceuta (Detail)

Source: Rezette, facing pp. 40-41.



Photo 2. Ceuta

Source: Spanish postcard with statue of Franco.

third area is a frontier. The isthmus on which the city is located has little in the way of natural fortification against land attack, therefore, at various times during the 1900's, a buffer has been extended outward to make it more secure. Between the main city of Ceuta and this frontier buffer is the Arab Quarter, the older section of town. The Moslems of Ceuta live in this small "barrio" (native section) which has its own mosque [Ref. 21].

Ceuta has no natural resources and too little land for much cultivation. However, an economic guide [Ref. 22] distributed by the city of Ceuta indicates that although the agricultural resources of Ceuta are limited, it does have some livestock: 5,000 pigs, 1,000 goats, 400 cows are raised in stables with some of the goats grazing on Mount Hacho and the frontier area between the city and the Moroccan border. Additionally, there are 1,750 acres of cultivated land of which 335 acres are irrigated (less than 20 percent). Rezette indicates that about 1960, intensive reforestation began in the frontier area. Over the centuries, much of the forest had been cut down to give a clear defensive observation area. In the mid-1800's, charcoal makers from Malaga used much of what wood remained for making charcoal. With about 20 years of growth since the reforestation program started, the forest is growing back, reducing the erosion problem that had occasionally existed previously.

Water is a problem in Ceuta, as it is in Gibraltar. Recently, however, ". . . the cabinet (of Spain) has decided to spend 350,000 pesetas (approximately \$300,000) for improvement of the water supply for Ceuta" [Ref. 23]. Ceuta officials indicate that they have two

cisterns. A main reservoir located in the frontier area near the border to the west was pointed out on a large map of Ceuta in the town hall. The quality of the water appeared to be excellent; it had a good taste. All pools were filled, and all fountains were in operation during the daytime and early evening. By contrast, Melilla's water tasted slightly salty and overtreated. The pool at the Melilla parador had no water in it. The desk clerk explained that drought was the reason. None of Melilla's many fountains and parks, in which the city takes such pride, had water in them.

2. People

The population of Ceuta is 66,550 as of 1 December 1981.* Information varies widely regarding the ethnic breakdown of the population. Most sources say that from 80-100 percent of the population is Spanish. Whenever the question was asked of Spanish officials of how many Moroccans live in Ceuta or Melilla, the immediate response in both Ceuta and Melilla was 12,000. For Ceuta this means that 18 percent of the population is ethnically Moroccan.**

Other minorities in the area include 270 ethnic Indians. Many of them are shop owners or businessmen. I came in contact with two such individuals in the enclaves. The first was a businessman who lived in the Canary Islands. I met him on the 18-hour ferry ride from Melilla to Ceuta. He was one of about five civilians that took the ferry all

*This figure was quoted by the official chronicler of Ceuta in an interview at Ceuta's Town Hall.

**Ethnically Moroccan as it is used here, includes Arabs and Berbers. This is to differentiate from those who are official Moroccan nationals with passports or official papers identifying them as citizens of Morocco. Further discussion of the official Spanish divisions is contained below.

the way to Ceuta.* The Indian businessman had a British passport. He spoke no English, only Spanish, a little French, and presumably his native tongue. He was not a resident of either Ceuta nor Melilla, but rather of Las Palmas in the Canary Islands. When I asked about his business, he simply said he had lots of different commercial concerns. He said he used to live in Tetouan, apparently when it was still a part of the Spanish Protectorate. Although he now lived in the Canaries, he said he liked Tetuoan. According to him, it was quiet, and did not encourage tourists. Not like Tangier, he said.

The other Indian man with whom I spoke was a shop owner. His shops sold cameras, radios, watches, and porcelain. He owned six such shops. He said he spoke five languages. In our informal conversation he said that he had left India at the age of three. He now had a Spanish passport. In talking about the Indian population, he said that there were about 330 Indians, including families. Whatever the exact number, the Indians comprise less than one percent of Ceuta's population. About 30-32 ethnic Indians owned between 45 and 50 small businesses, probably the camera outlets like his.** Obviously, some of the Indians own more than one shop, as he does. Their shop ownership seems slightly disproportionate with their number as a percentage of the total population.

*The rest of the passengers on the ferry were soldiers and sailors, and a few relatives. The crew of the ferry was civilian. The military men were coming from, or going to, the minor enclaves of Velez and Alhucemas. In Velez, the ferry picked up two young women. One was a Sergeant's wife, and the other presumably was her younger sister.

**Rezette identified some 900 small businesses in Ceuta in 1974. [Ref. 24].

Other Indians had various passports: some Spanish, some Indian, some British. He volunteered that he recommended to his sons that whatever country they decided to live in, they should become citizens of that country as soon as possible. He considered assimilation into the local culture to be very important. He felt that it made matters much easier in all respects. Shop permits for those with foreign passports apparently were not as easily granted as they had been in the past.*

The Indian shop owner said that another influential minority of similar size in Ceuta was the Jewish community. He thought there were about 300 Jews in Ceuta.**

Significant numbers of Jews were expelled from Spain during the Inquisition:

The dispersion following the Expulsion Edict was chaotic, following no set paths. Only one rule applied: the richer the Jew, the more liberal he could be with his bribes and, therefore, the

*Although there seems to be a lot of influence by the small Indian population, this could be deceptive. The Spaniards control the granting of shop permits and Spanish passports. It is my impression that these are not granted easily. Discussions with some U.S. State Department officials assigned in Morocco and Spain indicated that Indian commercial influence in the area--including Morocco, Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canaries--was significant. This I can neither confirm nor deny. I do, however, suspect that it is an area that the Spanish are aware of, and are attempting to both control and use it to their best advantage by selectively granting licenses and citizenship.

**The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged) defines "Sephardim" as "Jews of Spain and Portugal or their descendants, distinguished from the Ashkenazim chiefly by their liturgy, religious customs, and pronunciation of Hebrew". The origin of the term is from the Hebrew "Sepharad", a region mentioned in the Bible in Obadian 20. The Oxford Annotated Bible says that Sepharad was "wrongly thought to be Spain". It probably was originally a region in Asia Minor. (Additional source consulted: Webster's New World Dictionary.)

freer he was in his choice of destination. The poorest Jews fled across the Gibraltar straits into the mountains of Morocco. [Ref. 25].

In the early 1900's, Spain's policies were made more advantageous for the Sephardics:

The establishment of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco in 1912 ensured the immigration into Tetouan, Ceuta, and Larache of some 25,000 Jews, who became an important support group for Spain's policies in Africa. [Ref. 26].

The tie of Spanish nationalism to the Sephardic community is illustrated by the fact that during the Holocaust, Franco made it known that he would give protection to any of the Sephardics in Europe that could make it to Spain.*

With the independence of Morocco and the end of the Spanish Protectorate in 1956, a number of Sephardic Jews may have relocated in Ceuta, Melilla, and the Spanish mainland. Furthermore, there was a major reconciliation between Spain and the Jewish Community in the mid-1970's. Both Morocco and Spain have made major efforts to attract members of the Jewish community to return, who left those countries for the state of Israel in the late 1940's and early 1950's.

The significance of the Jewish population in the region is not really clear. Morocco set about on a campaign in the 1970's to win the return of many of the Jews that left Morocco for Israel. There currently are about 30,000 Jews in Morocco, [Ref. 27]. Some are quite influential. For example, the head of the government-run Moroccan Phosphate Office, (Office Cherifien des Phosphates), in Paris is a

*This was Franco's official policy. According to the personal accounts of Jews who escaped the Holocaust by going through France and Spain to Portugal, their worst treatment during the journey was by the local authorities in Spain.

Moroccan of Jewish descent.*

During my visit to Ceuta, I spoke briefly with one of the functionaries at the town hall. She was a Spaniard of Jewish descent. She probably was in her early 30's. As a child she had lived in Melilla, was educated in Tangier schools where she learned to speak beautiful English. She now works for the local government in Ceuta. After we had concluded our discussion and she had left, the official chronicler of Ceuta, a man probably in his late 50's, said to me as an aside that she was "Israeli". Although it was my impression that everyone in the office had a great deal of respect for her talents and abilities, including the chronicler who seemed quite proud of her, I thought it unusual that he made a special point to identify her as a Spanish Jew.

The Moroccan population of Ceuta, and indeed of Melilla as well, is one of the major areas of contention between Spain and Morocco. It is one of the issues with which the local government must concern itself directly. Specific issues affect the relations between the Spaniards and the local ethnic Moroccans, and the Moroccan nationals that are day workers and traders in Ceuta and Melilla. The specific issues usually have to do with discrimination, control of the number of legal and illegal Moroccans that work, live, or own property in the enclaves, and smuggling.

*This was related to me by Mr. W. F. Stowasser, a phosphates expert and physical scientist with the U.S. Bureau of Mines, Section of Non-metallic Minerals. Mr. Stowasser, who has worked often with the O.C.P. officials, said that the office was run effectively and efficiently by the influential individual who holds this post so critical to Morocco's single resource economy.

The 12,000 figure given by officials as the Moroccan population of Ceuta is confusing and deceptive. This figure only includes those that stay overnight in the city, i.e., those that live in the main city of Ceuta or in the Arab Quarter. Thousands of Moroccans from the surrounding countryside cross the border into Ceuta daily. During three hours of observation of the frontier border crossing, there seemed to be little if any concern on the part of either Moroccan or Spanish customs police at the border for inspection of what was carried into Ceuta, either by car or on one's person.* Many Moroccans in western dress drove through, as did many tourists and Spaniards as well. I was told that many Spaniards go into the Moroccan countryside for food and produce because it is cheaper than in Ceuta, where it is mostly brought over from the mainland by ferry or imported from Morocco. There is a very limited cultivated, irrigated area in the frontier area.

At the border, many women in caftans went on foot, in and out of Ceuta. Much of the traffic appeared to be for transporting small amounts of produce into Ceuta to sell or trade for Spanish products such as clothing or blankets which they took back to Morocco.

*Moroccan customs police did strip search a group of five young European backpackers as they passed from Morocco into Ceuta. I was told later by my Moroccan guide who was with me from Ceuta to Tangier airport, that authorities cooperatively had tightened up on drug trafficking considerably over the last five years on both sides of the border and Strait. He recounted that he used to know a lot of American sailors from Rota that came down through Ceuta to Morocco in the early and mid-1970's. But, as more and more were caught, his acquaintances became fewer and fewer. Now, he said, it is rare that he gets to meet American sailors. He was proud of the fact that he had known sailors from about 20 different states.

The Arab Quarter of Ceuta is more segregated from the main part of the city. By contrast, the Arab Quarter of Melilla is, of necessity, close to, and somewhat intermingled with, the main part of that city. This is due primarily to the fact that Ceuta's nine square mile area has allowed more room for expansion into the frontier area than Melilla's four square miles. This helps account for the fact that there were far fewer people in the traditional Moroccan caftan in downtown Ceuta than the many in the heart of Melilla, whose Arab Quarter is quite nearby.

There are two general categories of Moroccans in the city enclaves:

1. Those who live there.
2. A floating population, i.e., those that enter daily by the frontier border. This figure is between 6,000 and 8,000, and includes maids and other laborers, as well as those who come to trade.*

The Spanish Government in Ceuta and Melilla officially divides the Moroccan population into four groups:

1. Moroccans with Spanish nationality (Spanish passports).
2. Moroccan nationals legally registered in Ceuta or Melilla with official residence permission. A subcategory here is the relatives of these legally-registered Moroccan nationals.
3. People with special cards who worked in the Spanish Protectorate before Moroccan independence and are neither Moroccan nor Spanish.
4. Clandestine residents.

*The floating population is the one which apparently is responsible for much of the smuggling which the Moroccan authorities say is such a problem.

Although the official total of special Moroccans in Ceuta is 12,000, I was told, unofficially, that this official number is always lower than the actual figure. The difference is, no doubt, from the clandestine residents with forged papers and the like.

While I was at the government delegate's office, I observed a Moroccan woman with a special identification card waiting to see one of the top Spanish officials. She was a large woman, appeared to be in her 30's, was dressed in a caftan, and wore no veil. Presumably with the special card, she would fit into the third category above. She was trying to get a special permission slip, possibly regarding medical care, signed by an official. Both she and the clerks conducted their business in Spanish. They all worked fairly patiently as she continued her way up the chain of command explaining her situation in Spanish to each one as she went. Eventually, the permission slip was taken from her to the official, apparently the government delegate, who signed it. The clerk brought it out of the delegate's office and the woman was on her way.*

3. Government

Ceuta has a civil government, and the city is administered as a municipality of the Cadiz Province. The Information Attaché at the Spanish Embassy in Washington, D.C., indicated in a letter response (dated 29 July 1982) to my query regarding Ceuta and Melilla that ". . . the position of the Spanish Government is to consider them as Spanish Provinces, the same as the rest of the other provinces".

*More discussion of the Moroccan populace is continued in the section on Melilla below.

He pointed out that "this means that they have representatives in the Spanish Parliament: Ceuta (one Deputy and two Senators), and Melilla (one Deputy and two Senators)". He finished his description with the statement: "The Spanish State has total sovereignty over both Provinces." While it is true that there is a similarity between the provinces and the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in terms of individual representation in the Cortes, that is one of the only areas of similarity, although an important one.

Actually, there are 50 Spanish provinces. Ceuta and Melilla are not included in that figure. Ceuta and Melilla have municipal governments, and a government delegate (Delegado del Gobierno), but no provincial government. The Delegado del Gobierno has civil authority and answers to the Ministry of the Interior. "There also is a government subdelegate and one delegate from each of the ministries," [Ref. 28]. The Commandancia-General has military authority. A Mayor is in charge of the municipal government at the Ayuntamiento (town hall). "Provinces are constituted by the association of municipalities (8,655 in 1970)", [Ref. 29]. Ceuta and Melilla are so small, both in area and population that there is no need to be a province, nor to have a provincial government; the city does it all. Any provincial administration links that may be required are fulfilled by Cadiz Province for Ceuta, and by Malaga Province for Melilla.*

Through all of this, however, Ceuta and Melilla remain special because of their slightly different situations. They are not large like the other two parts of noncontiguous metropolitan Spain--namely, the Canary Islands (which constitutes two provinces with over 700,000 people in each) or the Balearic Islands (one province with 640,000 people).

*The other minor enclaves also are administered by Malaga Province, but little, if any, civil administration is required at those garrisons.

On the other hand, some of Spain's 50 provinces have populations in the same range as the combined total of 120,000 of Ceuta and Melilla. For example, Soria, a province in the Old Castile Region has only 105,000 people; Guadalajara Province in the New Castile Region has 144,000; Teruel Province in Aragon and Segovia Province in Old Castile have less than 160,000 each, [Ref. 30]. In each of these cases, however, the provinces are much more spread out and have many small municipalities. Therefore, it appears impractical to grant full provincial status to the tiny pieces of sovereign territory in North Africa.

By the same token, it is advantageous to have an administrative link in mainland Spain, such as Cadiz and Malaga Provinces, to which the noncontiguous cities of Ceuta and Melilla can be anchored.

4. Armed Forces

The Army is a major interest group in the enclaves in general, and in Ceuta and Melilla in particular. In 1981, the Army had 9,000 soldiers deployed to Ceuta. The makeup included one armored cavalry regiment, one Foreign Legion regiment, one coastal artillery/AA regiment, one engineering regiment, two Regulares battalions, one light cavalry group, and one special sea unit, [Ref. 31].

The Foreign Legion was considered the best combat unit in the service. It was formed in Morocco after Spanish officers had observed the performance of the French Foreign Legion and decided to model a Spanish unit after it. Spain's legion never acquired the international flavor of its French counterpart, even though for many years a number of its men were Moroccan. In 1975, the legion was composed largely of Spanish troops; discipline was strict, and morale was high, [Ref. 32].

Further discussion of the Army's historical role in Morocco is developed in Chapter III, History.

Although the Navy works out of Ceuta periodically, and has some constant presence, it does not have a major naval base there. Port visits by Spanish Navy ships, including the aircraft carrier Dedalo, with its VSTOL aircraft and helicopters, occur approximately three or four times per year. It is likely that some inshore patrol launches, and possibly some of the new fishery protection cutters that were scheduled to be built, are maintained there.

There is no runway at Ceuta, and consequently, no Air Force presence. A military heliport, which is under construction, likely will be used by helicopters of all three services.

5. Economy

Ceuta has no major mineral extracts, and no industry for semi-finished and finished goods. It depends on its business as an excellent Mediterranean port at a major shipping crossroads, its revenues as one of Spain's four duty-free ports of entry,* and, to a lesser extent, tourism and fishing.

a. The Port

The city of Ceuta has an excellent natural harbor. Competition from Gibraltar, 12 nautical miles across the Strait, and Tangier, 24 nautical miles west, and the lack of surrounding productive territory have prevented its full development. Nonetheless, Ceuta has been classified as nearly as busy as Bilbao, the second busiest port in mainland Spain. Palma de Mallorca in the Balearics, and Ceuta, have similar port statistics in terms of volume of traffic. These statistics include

*The other dutyfree ports are the Canaries, Melilla, and Andorra. Although Andorra is not a part of Spain, Spaniards consider it one of the dutyfree entry ports.

all of the ferry entries and exits from Ceuta. Therefore, in terms of annual tonnage, Ceuta is farther down on the Spanish port facilities rankings. As a free port, Ceuta has prospered from the border closure between Spain and Gibraltar, which also is a free port. According to the Spanish Economic News Service, "the opening of the [Spain-Gibraltar] frontier will certainly reduce the trade prosperity of Ceuta", [Ref. 33]. If this is true, then it appears that this reduction in Ceuta's trade prosperity would be yet another way in which the Gibraltar border opening, or the return of Gibraltar to Spain, could have ill effects on the enclave issues.

The port facility at Ceuta is much larger and busier than that of Melilla. It is on a cape, and therefore set apart from the countryside, and gives the impression from a distance, of being a cleaner, more modern port city than Melilla. Melilla does have modern port facilities and cranes on its main pier area, but it is considerably smaller than Ceuta. (See discussion on Melilla's port below.)

Upon entering the port, Ceuta appears to have many more tall, new buildings than Melilla. This gives Ceuta a much more modern look. There is much more useable pier space in Ceuta than in Melilla because much of Melilla's inner harbor is taken up by its beautiful recreational beach.

Ceuta's location at the busy strait contributes greatly to its traffic. Whereas, Melilla, located 130 nm inside the Mediterranean, gets little traffic that is not directly destined for the port itself. Once ships pass through the Strait of Gibraltar eastbound, most usually they will turn east northeast, heading for Cabo de Gato, where once clear of



Photo 3. Santa María de la Paz Ferry
(Connects the enclaves.)

the Alboran Sea, they will head more northeasterly for Europe's busy Mediterranean ports in northern Spain, southern France, or Italy. Even for ships destined for the eastern Mediterranean, or for North African ports including Algiers, the most direct route will keep them some 60 nautical miles north of Melilla.

Although Ceuta's port does not have a polluted appearance, it pays a price for high traffic. Its port water inside the breakwater was more polluted than that of Melilla.

Ceuta can accommodate more ships than Melilla, because of its layout and development.* During my stay in Ceuta, I observed 10 large cargo ships, and three ferries in port. Even with this many ships, the port did not appear particularly crowded. There were a number of empty berths that could accommodate more ships. I could see only a few ships closely enough to observe nationality. The flags represented were Germany, Sweden, Norway or possibly Denmark, and the Soviet Union. The Soviet container ship was from Odessa, and was berthed at the first pier on the left as one enters port. When that ship departed the following day, another Soviet merchant ship came into port within three hours of the other's departure. Harbor tug-boats maneuvered it into the same berth that the previous Soviet ship had occupied.**

*Melilla has a compromise situation with regard to Moroccan usage which affects its potential capabilities, but based on its present facilities and the lack of natural traffic it gets due to its location, the existing Spanish and Moroccan compromise usage seems to serve adequately Spain's needs, and is a workable solution for the Moroccans to develop the hinterland south of Nador as well. A fuller discussion of Melilla and its port facility is listed below.

**I place no special significance on the Soviet ships other than the fact that during my brief stay of less than two days in Ceuta, a

The port facility at Ceuta had many sport and recreation boats. In fact, there were rows and rows of pleasure motor craft. This was in contrast to the fairly small nautical club at Melilla which included some small sailboats for the most part.

The ferries at the port included two that shuttle back and forth between Ceuta and Algeciras, and one, the Santa Maria de la Paz, that is used only for the Ceuta/Melilla/Ceuta weekly runs between the enclaves.* Ceuta is only a one-hour ferry ride from Algeciras. Since it is a shorter journey than the Algeciras-Tangier connection, it rivals Tangier as an easy entry to Morocco from Spain, and further benefits from this easy access.

b. Duty-Free Goods

Since the mid-1960's, Ceuta has been a designated duty-free port of entry for Spain. This designation has no doubt shifted the local economy from one of fishing primarily, and port activities to one of small individual commercial trade. By far the most obvious form of trade with the most numerous outlets is the small appliance, radio, camera, and watch shops. The number of these small appliance stores in Ceuta is probably about 500. The products sold range from portable radios, cassette tape recorders, and stereo equipment,

Soviet merchant ship was present the entire time with the exception of three hours when one departed port only to be replaced in very short order by another. This yielded near-continuous Soviet presence throughout the 42-hour period of my observation. This may be an exception, or even a normal situation, and in either case may signify nothing.

*The Santa Maria de la Paz was built in Valencia in 1967. Its statistics are: 220 feet long; net tonnage 562.9; gross tonnage 1,199; crew 36; normal load 250 passengers; maximum load 386 passengers. A sister ship is the Semana de la Caridad.

to home video recorders, televisions, pocket cameras, movie cameras, and 35mm single lens reflex cameras, to digital watches and calculators. Numerous small kitchen appliances produced in Spain, as well as sporting goods and leather products, are also sold in large quantities.

The 1981 import/export ratio for Ceuta was 3.94:1. Exact figures are: imports, 15.172 billion pesetas, or approximately \$136 million; exports, 3.859 billion pesetas, or approximately \$25 million dollars.* By contrast, the 1979 import/export ration was 6.86:1. Exact figures are: imports, 9.607 billion pesetas, or \$137.4 million; exports, 1.389 billion pesetas, or \$19.87 million dollars, [Ref. 34].

The difference between the imports and the exports is significant. Most of the imported items are sold in the small shops at the lower duty-free prices to individual customers, and therefore do not show up in the overall totals.

Of special interest is the countries from which Ceuta imports. In 1981, Japan was first, providing 29 percent of all of Ceuta's imports. Surprisingly, the Soviet Union was second, supplying 15 percent of Ceuta's 1981 imports. Ceuta imported more from the Soviet Union than from any other European country. The commodities which Ceuta imports from the Soviets were not indicated. Third overall, France supplies 10 percent of Ceuta's imports. The last seven, each supplying less than seven percent are: China, Benelux, U.S., U.K., Hong Kong, Federal Republic of Germany, and Taiwan. Ceuta

*Dollar figures based on exchange rate of 111 pesetas per \$1.

officially imports less than 0.03 percent of its goods from Morocco. Exports figures show that 99 percent of Ceuta's official exports go to foreign ships. Although I am unable to document this information, I was advised that both Ceuta and Melilla levy a 10 percent local surcharge on all imported goods immediately on entry into the port. This 10 percent goes into the city coffers, making the city treasuries among the most affluent in Spain, without high taxes. The cities of Ceuta and Melilla therefore do not suffer from a lack of funds for local projects, municipal buildings, parks, improvements and repairs, as do many of the cities and towns in the mainland.

The goods that are bought at the stores, tax-free, are either taken back to the mainland, or to the tourist's home country, or, as Morocco claims, smuggled into Morocco. The Moroccan Government says this deprives them of import revenues, and promotes a large black market. On the other hand, it provides a livelihood for the people of the surrounding Riff. The Riff is one of the poorest and most neglected areas in terms of economic development in all of Morocco. Further discussion of smuggling is continued below.

c. Fishing

The importance of fishing has dropped off somewhat in Ceuta for a number of reasons. The Moroccan authorities imposed restrictions on foreign fishing by extending the boundaries on territorial and economic waters, and subsequently, seizing boats and crews. In the years between 1970 and 1980, the number of fishing boats registered in Ceuta has steadily decreased. In 1970, 148 fishing boats were registered in Ceuta, totalling 2,111 tons. By 1973, the number of fishing boats had dropped to 65, totalling 730 tons. Figures for 1980

were 57 boats, 824 tons, [Ref. 35]. Tonnage of catch was 2,700 tons in 1971, and 1,900 tons in 1980. Over 3,000 tons were caught in each of the four years 1974, 1976, 1977, and 1978. By comparison, figures from the early 1960's indicate that Ceuta had a 6,000 ton per year fishing industry, [Ref. 36].

d. Tourism

Ceuta continues to promote tourism, and is expanding its capabilities. In 1975, Ceuta was one of the areas singled out (along with San Sebastian and Santander in northern Spain) to share government loans of two billion pesetas for hotel construction, [Ref. 37].

Ceuta's location as a convenient port of entry from Spain to Morocco gives it a large volume of passenger and vehicle traffic. It was the second busiest port in Spain in 1980 in these two areas, [Ref. 38]. Efforts have been made to encourage some of the large volume of tourist traffic going between Europe and Morocco to stay in Ceuta for a day or two, either coming or going.*

Ceuta's accommodations include two four-star hotels, one three-star hotel, and 11 smaller pensiones and hotel-residences. In addition, there are a number of rooms that are rented out by local families in their homes or apartments. In all, there are 36

*Rather than simply promoting the day bus trips to Ceuta from Malaga, tour groups are brought down from Malaga to stay overnight. I observed a large group of British tourists that checked into my hotel for a two-night stay in Ceuta. They arrived Saturday night, and were scheduled to tour on Sunday, presumably visiting part of Morocco as well. Monday was for shopping in Ceuta. Monday afternoon or evening they were to return to Malaga. This apparently was promoted as a way to attract people to stay for more than just a day trip.

establishments with 566 rooms, [Ref. 39]. Tourist beaches are on the south side of the cape, away from the port. They are fairly narrow, with coarse sand and stones rather than the fine sand that characterizes Melilla's beaches. With some excellent stretches of beach which Morocco has developed from just south of the Ceuta frontier, to southeast of Tetouan, Ceuta's beaches have no major drawing as a tourist attraction.

e. Smuggling

Smuggling is a problem which is extremely difficult to document. Based on accounts by some of the residents, it is fairly widespread. However, the term "smuggling" apparently is used to describe a wide range of activities. I was told by some residents of Melilla, for example, that smuggling ranges from small to medium to large-scale operations.

The small-scale includes such things as a Moroccan woman bringing fruit or eggs to sell at the market in Ceuta or Melilla. She returns to Morocco with a blanket or a radio to resell at a market in Morocco.

The medium-scale smuggling can get fairly sophisticated, with the use of a special smuggler's girdle. The individual enters the city via the frontier border. Dressed in a caftan, the appearance is that of a thin person. The individual makes duty-free purchases at the various radio, camera, and watch outlets. Before crossing the border to return to Morocco, the individual goes into an alley, unpacks the items and places them in the special girdle. Then, leaving a pile of empty boxes behind, a fat person in a caftan crosses the frontier border at the end of the day, returning to Morocco. Small bribes may

be involved here in order to pass through Moroccan customs.* The large-scale operations are likely to be quite sophisticated, and likely include bribes to local Moroccan officials, or the soldiers** who do the inspection at the border. The residents told me of one instance in which authorities caught a man who had a garage that was right on the border. It had two openings. He would fill his bus with goods, and in the evening he would pull it into the garage via the door on the Spanish side. The next morning, he would drive it out of the door on the Moroccan side.

Whether or not these descriptions are completely factual, they are indicative of the type of discussions that go on regarding smuggling in the region. It is the type of thing Spanish officials try to play down. Moroccan officials who want to present the enclaves in a certain way try to emphasize this subject. Whatever is the magnitude of the problem, the careful customs check which I observed at the Ceuta border between Spain and Morocco was by the Moroccans,

*With regard to bribes, Moroccan customs officials would not allow me to take some of my research papers into the country because they were considered ethnically sensitive. A Moroccan guide who observed this situation approached me in the no-man's land between the two customs gates and asked how much the papers were worth to me, and said that he could get them across if I so desired.

**Another example of such activity is illustrated by the rather unusual question asked of me at the final check in the Casablanca airport. The guard asked the usual question regarding the prohibition of taking Moroccan dirham out of the country. He then asked, as he was going through my bags, how much American money I had. He asked the same question of two other U.S. Government employees that were on the same flight. On the other hand, this may have been a single isolated soldier. I observed some extremely conscientious individual young soldiers performing their duty well in other instances.

and not the Spaniards. Long lines and delays characterized the entry into Morocco. Swift and smooth flow of traffic characterized the passage into Ceuta, which is only natural as it is a free port.

Money-changing is another form of smuggling which I observed as well. During the evening, while awaiting transportation from the port at Melilla, a Moroccan in western dress approached me and asked if I needed change. After my negative reply, he asked if I had any dirham or dollars that I wanted to get rid of. He had a special rate. When I advised him that it was illegal, he became quite concerned and said that it was none of my business. He then showed me a large roll of money, and bragged that he had dirham, dollars, pesetas, francs, marks and pounds. He said he would do whatever he liked, and then he left the port building.

6. Communications

Ceuta has 33 miles of roads, and 1,889 cars (1978). Although a 1965 National Geographic map of the area shows a railroad linking Ceuta with Tetuan, other more current maps from different sources do not have this depicted. If the railway is still in place, apparently it is inactive. I observed no train connections from Ceuta to Tetuan, and saw none mentioned in any of the travel literature. The railway line probably stopped being used after the protectorate was disestablished in the 1950's.

Ceuta has no television station of its own. It has a repeater station for Spanish national radio and television. The Middle East and North Africa, 1981-82 lists a local commercial radio station, Radio Ceuta, [Ref. 40]. Ceuta is within easy reception of stations from peninsular Spain.

Passenger and automobile ferry service connects Ceuta with Algeciras on the Spanish mainland. There are at least eight round trips daily between 0800 and 2200 hours, with five round trips on Sunday. During the tourist season, as many as 15 round trip passages are made daily. The crossing takes one hour.

As mentioned previously, a weekly ferry connects the North African enclaves. It departs Ceuta at 2330 hours on Monday, stops at Peñon de Velez and Alhucemas on Tuesday morning, and arrives at Melilla on Tuesday afternoon. Every other Thursday, the ferry goes from Melilla to Chafarinas in the morning and returns in the afternoon. Persons not in the Spanish military must obtain permission from the military commander of Melilla before a ticket can be purchased for the trip to Chafarinas. Requests usually are granted if there is approximately two days prior notice. The ferry departs Melilla for the return trip to Ceuta at 2315 hours on Thursday. It again stops at Alhucemas and Peñon de Velez on Friday morning, and arrives at Ceuta at 1800 hours on Friday evening.*

There are no air facilities at Ceuta. The nearest airports are in Morocco at Tetuan, 20 miles south, or at Tangier, 50 miles west by car. Gibraltar is the closest airfield to Ceuta at 12 nautical miles across the Strait by boat. There are no direct connections

*Disembarking at Peñon de Velez and Isla Alhucemas is for Spanish military only unless by prior permission. Other than those civilians accompanied by military personnel, or with military business, no others may disembark from the ferry. The ferry captain, accompanied by an Army major who was enroute to duty at Alhucemas, went to the rock and returned after a stay of about 30 minutes.

between Ceuta and Gibraltar. The military heliport under construction at Ceuta is expected to be expanded to handle civil helicopters within two to three years of opening, [Ref. 41].

Ceuta has direct-dial telephone service to the mainland, and overseas capability via Madrid. There were 10,789 phones, one for each 6.5 inhabitants in 1978. Telegraph service is available.

Ceuta has four year-around cinemas, and four summer outdoor cinemas. There are two daily newspapers: Diario de Ceuta, and El Faro de Ceuta. In the Saturday edition of the papers published during my stay in Ceuta, each paper ran an article on Ceuta and its future. Whether it is an often written about subject, or just an isolated instance, is unknown. There also was an article on the proposed Strait of Gibraltar bridge. It condemned the project.* Special coverage was given to happenings across the Strait in the towns around Algeciras Bay. Especially Diario de Ceuta gave the impression of close contact between southern Spain and Ceuta in its local news, advertising, and sports coverage.

7. Religion, Education, and Health

There are a number of Roman Catholic churches in Ceuta, and at least one mosque in the Arab quarter. In 1980-81, there were 13,778 students in preschool, middle school, secondary schools, and special education schools in Ceuta. There were 399 teachers. (These figures include a small number of private schools.) Preschool students numbered 2,000, with 51 teachers; middle school (E.G.B., Educacion General Basica,


*Discussion of this area of potential cooperation between the two countries is contained in Chapter V.

ages eight to 14), 11,000 students and 323 teachers; special education, 53 students and 9 teachers. Those students in B.U.P. (Bachillerato Unificado Polivalente), university preparation, number 1,721 students with 93 teachers. This figure is down from 4,400 in 1969-70, apparently due in large part to a massive reduction in scholarship aid and free education at that level which occurred between 1970 and 1974, [Ref. 42]. Ceuta has one main hospital, and three clinics.

C. MELILLA

Melilla is the other large city enclave in North Africa. It is located on the east side of the very distinctive Cabo de Tres Forcas (also called Cap de Trois Forches, or Cape Uarc). The cape extends approximately 15 nautical miles into the Mediterranean. The so-called "Melilla anchorage" is a popular Soviet West Mediterranean anchorage because of the protection afforded on either the east side or the west side of the cape, depending on the prevailing winds and weather. Melilla's position, 90 nautical miles south of the Spanish mainland and 130 nautical miles east southeast of Gibraltar, puts it out of the mainstream of Mediterranean shipping traffic. It is much less accessible from the Spanish mainland than Ceuta. Daily round trip ferry service connects Melilla with Malaga, eight hours away. Another ferry route connects Melilla with Almeria on the southeastern coast of southern Spain. It also is an eight hour trip.

As mentioned previously, there are five flights daily that connect Melilla with Malaga. Scheduled air service also is available to Almeria. These types of ferry and air services keep Melilla, an otherwise isolated Spanish city, in close contact with the mainland.



Map 8. Melilla (Detail). Note: Runway added, position approximate; Breakwater (dashed line) is approximate.

Source: From Rezette, facing pp. 40-41.



Photo 4. Melilla

Source: From a Spanish postcard.



Photo 5. Melilla: The Spanish Port Facility



Photo 6. Melilla Harbor: Moroccan Port Facility

Note: Consult Map 8; photo taken from high ground .5 mile west of Melilla Antigua; looking southeast; foreground right structure is Spanish railway trestle for iron ore (inactive).

A general feeling of isolation still prevails, however, as the city is half-surrounded by Morocco, and has no view of mainland Spain, as Ceuta has.

Melilla has an area of four square miles. Its shape is almost like a half-moon, with the old fortress on high ground in the center, and the main port facility below it. The frontier is between 1.5 and 2.2 miles from the fortress and the ferry terminal. The boundaries of the city are said to have been decided by connecting the impact points of cannonballs fired in various directions from the old fortress. Some variations appear in the boundaries as adjustments were made around the Moslem cemetery of Sidi Guariach where the tomb of a Moroccan saint is located.

The city of Melilla is divided into two primary areas: Old Melilla, the very small area where the old fortress stands, and New Melilla, the rest of the city. Parts of New Melilla probably were built at the turn of the century.

Climatically, Melilla is generally the same as Ceuta. Its average monthly temperatures are generally a few degrees warmer than those of Ceuta. Drought has struck the area for the past few years, which has put water at a premium. The prevailing winds are out of the north and northeast, referred to locally as Poniente and Levante, respectively. A five-to-ten knot wind blows almost constantly to cool the city. At times, the area gets extremely heavy winds which interrupt flight operations at the airport. Rough seas are associated with these heavy winds as well. Tourist literature from Melilla claims there are 200 clear days per year. Occasionally, fog sets in and remains over the

area for days, also prohibiting flight operations and air connections to mainland Spain.*

1. People

The population of Melilla is 53,593 as of 1 March 1981. With transient military families and tourists, the figure is raised to 58,449, based on information provided by the head of the statistics section of the Government Delegate's office in Melilla.** When I asked the official what the ethnic Moroccan population was in Melilla, the immediate response was 12,000 (officially, 12,200). The actual figure unofficially is probably around 15,000. I asked why the difference, and he said it was "like the Chicanos in California". The 12,000 figure means that twenty-two percent of Melilla's population

*Such heavy fog conditions occur only periodically. The fog will form and last for two-to-four days. This may occur two or three times a month. Then it may not happen again for six months. The resident who recounted this to me said that on the days that the airport is closed for fog, a feeling of being totally cut off from the mainland exists. He made no mention of fog affecting the ferry runs.

**Population statistics quoted for both Melilla and Ceuta have varied widely between 50,000 and 100,000. The 100,000 figure often is quoted in travel books such as Hagel's and Fodor's, [Ref. 43]. A Spanish Government hotel guide published in 1975 gave Ceuta's population as 70,092 in one place, and 75,000 in another. The same book gave Melilla's population as 77,877 in one place, and as 100,000 in another. Census figures in various atlases and yearbooks show similar disparity in population reporting. The figures given here are those provided by the Government Delegate's office. When compared to the figures of the 1950's, 1960's and early 1970's, the population of each city seems to be in a gradual decline. One still notices the presence of many children and young people in both cities. The education figures for each city confirm this as well. It appears that between 25 and 30 percent of the population of each city is under age 21.

is ethnic Moroccan. The Spanish officials make every effort to keep it at about that percentage.*

The Moroccan influence in Melilla is much more evident than in Ceuta. Although its appearance still is that of any typical Andalusian city, one sees many more people dressed in the traditional caftan in Melilla. There are two probable reasons for this. First, the city is so small that one must walk through the center of town to get from the main border gate to the Arab bazaar area, or anywhere else in the city. Secondly, unlike Ceuta which has heavy contact with peninsular Spain 10 nautical miles north, Melilla has historically had stronger economic links with the Moroccan interior. For example, the exploitation of the iron mines south of Melilla was a major commercial factor in Melilla's development during the Protectorate. Although these ties may be less significant today than at other times in the past, the population of Melilla seems to have relatively more Moslem ties than does that of Ceuta.

Many Melillans, especially those of military families, have lived there for years. Some families have had military men serving in the Melilla garrison for five and six generations. It is a military tradition. On the other hand, I was told by some residents that Spaniards from the mainland, especially professionals and skilled laborers, were drawn to work in Melilla by special pay incentives.

*I spoke with a British woman who is an English teacher at the local language school. She acted as interpreter during my interview with the statistics official at Melilla. She was married to a Moroccan man who had been trying to get an official residence card and working papers for almost one year. Without those papers he could not work officially in Melilla. He had to leave the city and go to Morocco every three months and renew his visa.

Teachers, for example, usually stay in Melilla for about five years. Government employees are paid approximately 50 to 60 percent higher salaries than those on the peninsula. It is an excellent opportunity to make money. If both adults in a family work, together they can earn four times the amount that one of them would make in Spain, where only one of them may be able to work, due to the unemployment situation.

After a person has lived in Melilla for a certain period of time, he may purchase a car duty-free. He must then drive it in Melilla for one year before he can take it back to the mainland tax-free. In this way, one can buy a Mercedes, for example, at a price that is below even the price of the car in Germany. Families usually accumulate a substantial savings of one or two million pesetas (\$9,000 to \$18,000) after working in Melilla, because of the higher salaries.

I was told that not too many individuals buy property in Melilla because they do not feel secure there. Conversely, I observed several new condominium apartments along the beach area. There also were at least seven large construction cranes working on new buildings in town.

There usually is some tension at the border as a Spaniard crosses into Morocco from Melilla. Harassment is the norm, and usually takes the form of delays of up to two hours, depending on the whim of the Moroccan border guard. Often Spaniards will go to the Moroccan town of Nador, ten miles south of Melilla, for produce or for a change of scenery. The United States has Peace Corps volunteers at Nador.

The same groupings of Moroccans discussed above for Ceuta apply for Melilla. There are officially 6,000 to 8,000 day workers in Melilla, which includes maids, for example. One resident said he

thought the figure was more like 20,000. He said that many use illegal cards, and therefore often are not on the official record books. If this were the case, however, such a discrepancy would show up on any count that was kept by the Spanish border guards. The official figures seem to be realistic. Apparently it is not unusual for Moroccans to come great distances from the interior to buy certain goods and appliances in Melilla. One resident told me that people come from towns and villages "up to 400 kilometers" (250 miles) away to purchase such things as small kitchen appliances, and even refrigerators, which are either not available or much more expensive in Morocco.

The older people in Melilla seem to harbor more prejudices with regard to the Moroccans than do the younger ones. It was Melilla that suffered and was threatened so often during the 1909-26 Riff War. Those involved in that war, and also possibly their children, likely help to keep prejudice and distrust alive in Melilla. For example, a taxi driver with whom I spoke was born in Melilla. He was possibly in his late 50's or early 60's. As we drove from the airport, he nearly hit two young Moroccan women who were crossing the street at a stop sign. Subsequently, he spoke to them very disparagingly. Although this may not be usual for a taxi driver, it appeared that since they were dressed in caftans, he assumed he had the right-of-way.

On the other hand, one of the Spaniards at the tourist office was telling me about his children. He said he had a 13 year old son who was studying two languages at school: English and Arabic. If this is an example of the type of education which the younger generation is receiving in Melilla, it may be the basis for establishing greater sensitivity, cooperation and understanding between the two countries.

If such programs were fostered by both countries, the interaction between the cultures at the commercial ports of Ceuta and Melilla could play a key role in building more positive relations between the two countries.

The Indian and Jewish minorities were identified as important ones in Melilla by my other interpreter, a Spaniard from Sevilla. He said that the two groups owned between 60 and 70 percent of the trade in Melilla. Such estimates may have no bearing on actual figures, as certain prejudices may exist. The Spanish Government has made an effort to control the amount of foreign ownership of businesses in the enclaves. If these minorities have Spanish passports, then the ownership estimates may be valid.

Rezette mentions that Melilla has a Chinese Quarter. I asked about this while in Melilla and was told that it is Chinese in name only. My university professor-interpreter said there are no Chinese in Melilla as Rezette implies. It is simply the name of a group of shops.

2. Armed Forces

The Army maintains 10,000 soldiers in Melilla. The makeup is the same as that of the Ceuta garrison. Melilla has the second highest concentration of troops outside mainland Spain. The Canary Islands command has 16,000 troops for nearly 2,800 square miles, and 1.6 million people. By comparison, Melilla has 10,000 troops for four square miles, and less than 60,000 people. Based on the relative isolation, distance from the Spanish mainland, lack of natural fortifications, lack of an extended frontier like Ceuta, Melilla's present vulnerability, and past experience, anticipation of problems in the area may be well founded.

Some Navy presence is likely. As referred to previously, periodic port visits by Navy ships, including the aircraft carrier Dedalo are planned quarterly, according to a Spanish Navy Matador (i.e., Harrier pilot). He told me that Ceuta and Melilla were not among his favorite port visits because both cities were too much like the surrounding Moroccan countryside. There was little of interest to offer visiting ships.*

No Air Force presence was observed at the Melilla airport. The DOD Flight Information Publication (Enroute) Supplement, Europe, North Africa, and Middle East indicates that the Melilla airfield, which was built in about 1968, is a civilian field and not for joint military use as is often the case with airfields on the mainland. The hard-surfaced, 3,200 foot runway, oriented 140/320 (northwest/south-east), could accomodate propellor transports, the Spanish Navy's VSTOL Matadors, and Army, Navy, and Air Force helicopters if required. Non-VSTOL jets could not operate from Melilla's airport.

Many of the military people stay in Melilla as long as they can. They receive a special pay differential as do so many of the workers in Melilla. Officers and noncommissioned officers bring their families to Melilla. With 10,000 soldiers in a four square mile area, it is obvious that the soldiers are virtually everywhere. On the other hand, young children and teenagers are everywhere as well. This makes Melilla seem less military-oriented, and more family-oriented.

*The excellent Melilla beaches, duty-free goods, historic fortress, and beautiful parks apparently were not adequate for this individual.

3. Government

Melilla has a civil governor, and is under the civil administration of Malaga Province. There is a military commander as well. One of the police guards at the entrance to the port told me that the military "governor" was more powerful than the civil governor in Melilla. This may be plausible, unofficially, in Melilla, because of its relative distance and frontier environment. Whereas in Ceuta I was told by the Government Delegate that he and the military commander worked closely, but that he, the civil authority, was in charge. Representation in the Cortes is the same as discussed for Ceuta.

4. Natural Resources

Eighty percent of Melilla's water comes from wells that are in the city. The remainder comes from wells located in Morocco, but which are Spanish owned. During the Spanish Protectorate (1912-1956), the Spaniards improved agriculture in the area surrounding Melilla, and during this time, built irrigation channels and dams. Up until the early 1960's, hydroelectric power was supplied to Melilla by one of those projects. Rezette says that five electric power stations were built by the Hispano/Moroccan Gas and Electric Company, and the National Electric Company. Melilla now is a supplier of electric power to some of the surrounding Moroccan territory, [Ref. 44]. The Muluya River has an irrigation system which provides water to crops on either side of it. Melilla serves as a market for the sale of much of the produce grown in the area. This includes wheat and barley, tobacco, some cotton, figs, olives, dates, bananas, as well as goats, sheep, some cattle, leather products and wood, [Ref. 45].

It is important to note that all this agricultural area, and whatever minerals exist in this region, are not in Melilla nor in Spanish-held territory. It would hurt the Moroccans in the surrounding area, as well as the Melillans, if the border between the two were to be closed. Morocco was apparently trying to reduce the dependence of this part of Morocco on the city of Melilla by developing the town of Nador. With the building of Morocco's own breakwater at Melilla harbor, these plans for development of Nador now may have a lower priority, [Ref. 46]. The Moroccan Government is extending its breakwater at Melilla to take advantage of the deepest part of the harbor. (See Map 8, and Photo 6.) The Spanish breakwater already has deep water access.

5. Commerce

a. Duty-Free Sales

The same type of shops are evident in Melilla as in Ceuta. Foodstuffs, shoes, textiles, and drinks are a major portion of the trade as well, [Ref. 47]. Some shops sell Moroccan handicrafts, including leather and brass goods. There is an open air bazaar in the Arab Quarter with shoes, clothing, leather goods, and brass for sale by sidewalk vendors.

In 1981, Melilla's import/export ratio was 5.3:1. Actual figures were: imports, 6.322 billion pesetas, or \$57 million; exports, 1.192 billion pesetas, or \$17.3 million dollars. Japan supplied 33 percent of all of Melilla's imports. Hong Kong was second with 16 percent. Each of the following supplied less than eight percent of Melilla's imports: China (eight percent), Germany (seven percent)

Taiwan (six percent), U.K. (five percent), Benelux (four percent), South Korea (two percent), Singapore (two percent), and Morocco (1.5 percent). The U.S. provided less than 0.5 percent of Melillian imports. Imports from the Soviet Union were valued at less than \$10,000, [Ref. 48].

b. Fishing

Melilla is known for its excellent seafood. The fishing industry does not play as large a role in Melilla's economy as it did in the past. There are only about 40 small fishing boats registered in Melilla now. They are equipped with large lights to attract the fish. As the ferry departed Melilla at 2330 hours, enroute to Ceuta, I observed the bright lights of these small boats which were fishing in Mar Chica, the bay area between Melilla and Chafarinas. The fishing boats return in the morning with the overnight catch.

About 30 of the fishing boats belong to Spaniards. The other ten belong to Moroccans. Moroccan fishing boats are said to work out of Melilla, rather than Nador, the small Moroccan port south of Melilla, because there is no ice in the Moroccan port, gas is cheaper in Melilla, and the fishermen get more money for their catch in Melilla than they do in Nador.

c. Port Facility

As mentioned previously, due to Melilla's location, commercial shipping does not have nearly the significance there that it has in Ceuta. Consequently, Melilla's port is not nearly as busy as that of Ceuta. The ferries were the only ships I observed coming and going during my two days of observation.

There are four large loading cranes, and the Spanish breakwater located on the north side of the harbor appears new and in excellent condition. A railroad track is shown to be in place on maps of the northern breakwater and pier. It was not used while I was there, and did not appear to have been used for some time.

A covered trestle loading dock juts into the center of the port. It is no longer in use. In the days of the Protectorate, this loading dock was connected by a small railway which linked Melilla with the low-grade iron ore region to the south, in Morocco.

A long southern breakwater of the harbor is Moroccan. This is a new development since 1979, and may be a significant breakthrough in terms of Spanish/Moroccan compromise in the area. Only a very small south pier is shown on maps dated 1975. This pier remains in place. It is not used very much, and appears to be undeveloped. It is situated directly in front of the Moroccan pier. The Moroccan breakwater and pier include a holding and short-term storage area. Construction work on the facility was still underway through September 1982. Two Moroccan ships were berthed at the pier.

One of the Moroccan complaints regarding Spain's continued presence in Melilla was that it denied Morocco the deep water port that Morocco needed to develop the iron ore region south of Nador. As mentioned previously, the port at Nador is too shallow for large ships, although dredging probably has been done in an attempt to change the situation. The existence of the Moroccan side of the port of Melilla may demonstrate that some compromise already has occurred for mutual coexistence in the area. On the other hand, it may be a unilateral

move by the Moroccans to work around the Spanish presence, and therefore gain the facilities that Morocco desires.

d. Tourism

Attempts have been made to attract tourists to Melilla. There have been varying degrees of success. During the summer, Spaniards from the mainland are drawn by the beaches and duty-free goods. Some French, German, Swiss, and Austrian tourists also apparently frequent the area during the summer while enroute to Morocco. After driving south through Spain, the central European tourists would take the overnight ferry from either Malaga or Almeria to Melilla. Many would then camp the next few nights at campgrounds in Melilla. This would give them an opportunity to enjoy Melilla's beaches before crossing into Morocco to tour the interior. Other accomodations in Melilla include one four-star hotel, one three-star, and ten one- and two-star hotel-residences and pensions.

A large placard in the center of town boasted of a recent soccer championship which was hosted by the city of Melilla. Teams from Portugal, Hungary, Germany, and the Spanish mainland, including Malaga, played in the tournament. I was told by a representative of the National Tourist Office that Melilla's team was considered very good in the tournament.

The National Tourist Office is not located in close proximity to the port, nor to the center square (as it is in Ceuta). It is on a side street in a residential area, some distance away from the main stream of traffic. Tourism is not one of Melilla's major areas of commerce. If there is a major reemphasis to attract more tourists,

the movement of the tourist office to the port facility, or near the downtown plaza likely will be one of the first indications.

Each year in May, Melilla hosts an international film festival called "International Film Week of Melilla". The 1982 event included film entries from Spain, France, Italy, Britain, the United States, Poland, and Mexico.

e. **Smuggling**

Smuggling apparently is as important a factor in Melilla as it is in Ceuta. Much of the preceding discussion on smuggling applies for both Ceuta and Melilla. Documentation of the smuggling situation is very difficult. Accounts vary widely, for example, note the following comment:

Smuggling in Ceuta and Melilla in the direction of Morocco is tolerated as the only way to furnish the Riffs, a very poor people, with some means of subsistence. People would have to be crazy when they live 50 kilometers from Ceuta or Melilla to buy products in Spain or Morocco that they can pay a quarter or a third of the price for in the two ports, [Ref. 49].

The degree of tolerance probably depends on the policy on a given day, or the size of the bribe to Moroccan customs. Smuggling to Algeria also may be a factor in the Melilla area.

6. **Communications**

Ferries are one of the main connections to mainland Spain. They link the mainland ports of Malaga and Almeria with Melilla by daily sailings.* Iberia Airlines has approximately five regularly

*In the Melilla ferry terminal, some Moroccans were waiting to ride the overnight ferry to Malaga. They were from the area south of Melilla and Nador, presumably Oujda. They spoke French, but no Spanish. They told me they were Moroccan guest workers enroute to Paris. The ferry was taking them to Malaga where they would board a train to Paris via Barcelona.

scheduled flights from Malaga to Melilla. During the summer season there may be more. The 30-minute flight is made in an Iberia-chartered Aviaco Airlines Fokker-27. The stewardess and flight crew on the aircraft were Aviaco employees. The Fokker-27 is a twin-engine, propellor-driven aircraft which carries 44 passengers. The one-way air fare is about \$30. The Iberia ticket agent at Malaga airport said that every flight to Melilla was usually full with a four-to-five passenger waiting list. My flight was no exception. Passengers were of all age groups, from old people to families with young children.

I noticed two unusual circumstances about the Melilla flight. First, the flight path for the final approach into Melilla took the aircraft directly over Cabo de Tres Forcas, which is Moroccan territory. There was no attempt to stay over water for as long as possible, nor to avoid Moroccan airspace. This is in contrast to the final approach for landing at Gibraltar. Strict entry point procedures, and bright orange buoys in the waters of Algeciras Bay mark the line over which approaching aircraft cannot fly when landing at Gibraltar. The Moroccans are apparently more tolerant, and place no airspace restrictions on flight operations into and out of Melilla.

The second unusual occurrence was the checking of passports on entry into the terminal at Melilla. This seemed unusual for a national flight arriving from another Spanish city. It is not the normal procedure in peninsular Spain. This further illustrates the difference between Melilla and the mainland.

*On departure from Melilla by ferry, passports were also checked.

The airport at Melilla is equipped with a Visual Approach Slope Indication system (VASI), and runway lights. It is VHF radio capable only. Its single wheel loading limit is 18,000 pounds. The only radio aids to navigation are two low frequency nondirectional radio beacons. Normal hours of operation are 0800-2000 hours, local. No railway connections are advertized between Melilla and any other Moroccan cities. The old railroad track that used to service the hinterland probably is still in place.

There is one national television repeater station at Melilla. There also is a local pirate station that operates on Saturdays and Sundays, and from 0800-1200 hours on Monday through Friday. The operator of the station was honored as Melilla's "Man of the Year" in 1981. In addition to these two stations, Melillans can receive one Moroccan television station, and one Algerian station.* In addition to the television stations, there is one FM radio station, Radio Melilla, which broadcasts from 1300-1900 hours.

El Telegrama de Melilla is Melilla's only newspaper. It is published every day except Monday. Originally, it was one of the newspapers that belonged to the institution of Spanish newspapers under Franco. As of September 1982, it was up for contract, and possibly would be going out of business. Melilla has one central post office.

*The close proximity of Algeria, Morocco, and Melilla leads to an unusual situation with regard to local time zones. In the summer there are three different local times within 50 miles. When it is 0900 hours in Melilla, it is 0700 hours across the border in Morocco, and 0800 hours in Algeria. The same two-hour time difference exists between Ceuta and the surrounding Moroccan countryside. After the last Sunday in September, Spain sets its clocks back, and the difference is reduced to one hour.

7. Religion, Education, and Health

There are a number of Roman Catholic churches in Melilla, and at least one mosque.* There were 11,573 preschool, middle school, and secondary school students in Melilla in 1981. There were 1,845 preschool students from ages four to six, including 1,224 in public schools, and 621 in private schools. There were 7,879 E.G.B. (Educacion General Basica) students from ages eight to 14, including 5,051 in public schools, and 2,818 in private schools. There were 1,849 students in B.U.P. (Bachillerato Unificado Polivalente), which is secondary school university preparation. These included 1,532 in public schools, and 317 in private schools. There were 85 B.U.P. teachers. Also, 682 students attended a state-run technical school. Special education for the handicapped had 66 students. Those enrolled in basic adult education numbered 554, including 374 in public schools and 180 in private schools. The grand total of students in Melilla was 12,875, with 8,939 in public programs, and 3,936 in private programs.

For higher education, Melilla has a branch of the U.N.E.D., (Universidad Nacional de Espana a Distancia). The branch of U.N.E.D. at Melilla started in 1976, and had its first graduates of the complete six year program in 1982. There also is a teacher training school, a nursing school, and a social workers school.

There is one civilian hospital, and one military hospital in Melilla.

*The church bells ring at various times during the day, much as they do in any city in mainland Spain. When one hears the calls of the muezzin from the local mosque, however, one realizes this is a city different from the mainland.


D. THE MINOR ENCLAVES

The "minor places" as the other three enclaves are called, are much less significant than Ceuta and Melilla, and aside from personal observations like my own, there is very little current information available on them. The Middle East and North Africa, 1981-82 indicates that the 1977 population statistics were: Velez, 71; Alhucemas, 63; and Chafarinas, 195, [Ref. 50]. No civilian or military breakdown is given, but this probably is the size of the military detachment. It appears that they are solely military garrisons now.

Civilian villages that some sources have described, probably ceased to exist on the enclaves shortly after the Protectorate was disbanded. Without close coastal ties, it is unlikely that villages would continue to function on the islands.

The garrisons apparently are maintained as a matter of principle. The origins of Spanish sovereignty on Velez and Alhucemas date back to before the 1700's. Chafarinas became Spanish during the 1800's. If they were relinquished, a domino effect might be anticipated by the Spaniards with regard to Ceuta and Melilla. Therefore, at cost and inconvenience, the island enclaves are maintained.

The minor places are under the nominal civil administration of Malaga Province. Velez likely has closer general ties with Ceuta, as it is the first and last stop for the ferry. Alhucemas likely has closer general ties with Melilla, as it is the first stop for the inter-enclave ferry both before arrival at Melilla and after departure from Melilla. Chafarinas is linked to Melilla because of its proximity to that city.



Map 9. Penon de Velez de la Gomera (Detail).

Source: From Rezette, facing pp. 40-41.



Photo 7. Penon de Velez de la Gomera.




Photo 8. Penon de Velez Showing Sand Bar Connection

1. Peñon de Velez de la Gomera

Velez, as it is usually called, is the westernmost of the minor places. The Area Handbook for Spain implies that the island served as a garrison outpost in the past, but that it no longer does, [Ref. 51]. It still was being maintained as an active garrison as of September 1982. A castle is on top of the island, and a few buildings which cling to the side of the slope make up what was once a village. As mentioned previously, the island is now connected to Africa by a low sand beach. Velez is two miles from a coastal Moroccan town named Torres el Kal'a, formerly called Torres de Alcala when it was Spanish.

2. Alhucemas Island

Alhucemas Island is about midway between the east and west extremes of the coastal enclaves. It is located in Alhucemas Bay, (Ajdir Bay). The bay is nine miles wide and five miles long. Maps show there are actually three islands in the bay, only one of which is claimed by Spain. The other two, Land Island and Sea Island, are nothing but long rocks, less than 20 feet above sea level, and are uninhabited. The rock which is Alhucemas Island is between 150 and 200 feet high. It is less than one mile off of the Moroccan coast. The 1967 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica says that the island is 1,422 yards offshore, [Ref. 52]. This appears to be correct. However, the same source says the island is 820 feet high (compare to Gibraltar's 1,398 feet, and Ceuta's Mount Hacho, 636 feet). Close scrutiny of the manmade structures on the island, and a comparison to the islands overall height indicates that it is not over 200 feet high. This source also says that on the island there is the building of the former



Map 10. Alhucemas Island (Detail).

Source: From Rezette, facing pp. 40-41.

Spanish presidio. The building was still used by the garrison that was stationed there in September 1982.

Additional information which is inaccurate regarding the enclave concerns actual dates when the Spaniards were to have left. "Occupied by the Spaniards from 1673 to 1961, the Peñon had a small garrison and a few families; all provisions and water were brought from Spain", [Ref. 53]. This account makes it sound as if the situation changed in 1961. However, Alhucemas still maintains a garrison of less than 100 soldiers. Some military dependents were there as well. Provisions and water must still be brought in from Ceuta and Melilla. The same source observes that the Moroccan town of Al Hoceima, formerly Villa Sanjurjo, had 11,239 inhabitants in 1960, ". . . the majority of whom were still Spanish".

According to two individuals with whom I spoke and who had lived in Al Hoceima after the Protectorate, many of the Spanish had left. There was still a Spanish school in the town as of 1981. Many well-to-do Moroccans in the town still sent their children to the school. The United States has Peace Corps volunteers at Al Hoceima. One of the volunteers told a former resident that the Alhucemas Bay area reminded him a great deal of the San Francisco Bay area. U.S. ships, including the Lemoore County, have made port calls at the town. Ten miles south of Al Hoceima, the largest Club Med in Morocco is located. It is directly across the narrow channel opposite the Spanish garrison on Alhucemas Island. According to Fodor's North Africa, the area is a truly beautiful place for pleasure boating and skin diving, and the bay area and valley are carefully being developed




Photo 9. Alhucemas Island

by the Moroccan Government, [Ref. 54]. A 7,000 foot runway is about 12 miles outside of the town of Al Hoceima. "The area is dry, but misty in summer." [Ref. 55].

3. Chafarinas Islands

The easternmost enclave, located 14 miles west of the Algerian border with Morocco, is the Chafarinas Islands. They lie 25 nautical miles from Melilla across Mar Chica (Little Sea). The three islands are between two and three miles off of the coast, are small and rocky, and form a semi-circle which could provide for an excellent anchorage. They have been under Spanish control since 1848. In 1910, the Spanish Government tried to construct a breakwater and roadway between Isabel II, the inhabited island in the center, and El Rey, the easternmost island in the group, which had been used as a cemetery. The plan was to further enclose this already sheltered and deep anchorage which is able to accomodate many large ships. In 1914, however, a storm opened a gap in the breakwater, [Ref. 56]. It apparently was never repaired.

The population figures for the island of Isabel II have ranged from 500 to 1,000. Most recent figures show 195 in 1977, [Ref. 57]. Probably all of these are military. The island has a lighthouse, a garrison, and a small village. (See photo of ferry terminal mural depicting Isabel II.) In 1910, it had ". . . several batteries, barracks, and a penal convict settlement", [Ref. 58]. The Islands are directly off the coast from the Moroccan town of Ras el Ma. Some fishermen may still live on the island, but generally those only with official military business, or special permission, may even board the ferry to the islands. The tourist office organizes an annual picnic outing to the islands for up to 50 people.



Map 11. Chafarinas Islands (Detail).




Photo 10. Chafarinhas Islands. (Probably Isabel II, center island.)

Source: Copy of an etching displayed in Melilla Ferry Terminal.

III. HISTORY OF THE ENCLAVES

A. GENERAL

"Spain in North Africa" and "North Africa in Spain" have been variations of the same story for 2,000 years. Centered on this area are the ancient myths of Atlas, for whom North Africa's 13,000 foot Atlas Mountains are named. The promontories of Gibraltar and Ceuta formed the "Pillars of Hercules"--the gateway to the ancient world.

In about A.D. 300, the Roman emperor Diocletian, who reigned from 284 to 305, attached the province of Morocco, Mauretania Tingitana, to the government of the peninsula. According to William Atkinson, this action "laid the foundation of the Peninsula's later claims to sovereignty over these territories," [Ref. 59].

Although dating claims back that far seems contrived, there is a similarity between the Moors and the Iberians, especially in southern Spain, due to their historical interaction over the last 1,500 years. Nevill Barbour describes the situation in the following way:

Relations between the two countries have therefore often been intimate, sometimes friendly, and sometimes hostile, and throughout history there has hardly been a moment at which some piece of territory on one shore has not been in possession of the government ruling on the other. . . . One can indeed regard the Iberian peninsula and Morocco, north of the Atlas, as forming a distinct region intermediate between Europe and Africa, Iberia being cut off from the rest of Western Europe by the Pyrenees as Morocco is from the rest of Africa by the Atlas and the Sahara." [Ref. 60].

The prophet Mohammed died in A.D. 632, and in very short order, Islam spread by conquest to Christian Spain. In 711, Moslems landed on Gibraltar (Gib al-Tarik) at the invitation of a Visigothic clan, and returned to Africa after a short stay. They came back to Spain

the following year intent on conquering the entire peninsula. Although this was the beginning of 750 years of Moslem presence in Iberia, the Spaniards mark it as the beginning of the "Reconquest" of Spain from Moslem domination.


The year was also the beginning of the Moorish invasion of Spain, and it was launched from Morocco. Here possibly are the beginnings of what lingers in modern Spain today as the "North Africa threat", or the idea of the "Threat from the South", [Ref. 61].

It was not until 1415 that the Iberians (Portuguese and Spaniards) were able to take the war successfully across the Strait by capturing a piece of Africa.* In 1415, the Portuguese captured Ceuta, and this success not only launched Portugal on its overseas conquest, but also gave it a foothold in Africa. This foothold might have been seized much earlier, because in about 1250, Ferdinand III of Portugal sent forces into Morocco to harass the Moors, and was planning a subsequent invasion with a large army when he died. Ferdinand's plan, [Ref. 62], died with him, and the later taking of Ceuta proved of little more than token importance. It was not until the 1490's that Spain took Melilla,** and in 1507, Peñon de Velez de la Gomera.

During the period 1509 to 1580, Spain developed enclaves all along the North African coast. Oran (1509), Bougie (1510), Tripoli (Libya in

*Spain did occupy Penon Island near Algiers from 1302 until the 1500's, but this was not as strategic a foothold as the area closer to the Strait.

**There are various dates given for the year in which Spain finally captured Melilla, including 1490, 1492, and 1497. The 1497 date is the one which appears on the Spanish statue in Melilla which commemorates the event.



Map 12. Dates of Acquisition

1510), and Tunis (1535) all fell to the Spaniards as they defeated the officials that ruled those areas as a part of the Ottoman Empire. Spain, however, had lost all of these with the exception of Oran by 1580. In the same year, however, and continuing for the next 60 years (until 1640), the Spanish incorporated Portugal and her dominions under the Spanish crown. Spain's possession of Ceuta is marked from 1580 at the earliest, or 1668 at the latest, depending on a number of technical details.* [Ref. 63].

In 1673, Alhucemas Island became Spanish. The following year, in 1674, the Moslems started a 26 year siege of Ceuta which ended in 1700. Again in 1775, the Moslems layed siege to both Ceuta and Melilla. During the 1780's, the piracy which had so long dominated the western Mediterranean was beginning to be brought under control.

In 1810, with the Napoleonic Wars and the French threat to Spain, the British occupied Ceuta at Spain's request. This probably took the form of reinforcement of the Spanish garrison and a showing of the flag to demonstrate Britain's resolve to secure the strategic choke point that was so vital to communications with its Indian Empire. Ceuta was returned to Spanish control at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Ironically, Gibraltar, across the Strait, had been British by this time for over 100 years.

*During the 60 years that Spain and Portugal had the same king, it is likely that the administration of Ceuta and all other Portuguese possessions was still accomplished from Lisbon. The year the two countries split, 1640, Spain assumed control of Ceuta. This may have been a gradual turnover. In 1668, official documents were signed regarding Ceuta. The only thing that can be said with certainty in regard to control of Ceuta, is that it was in European control, not Moslem control, from 1415 onward, even though there were numerous unsuccessful Moslem sieges to recover it.

In 1848, Spain gained control of, and occupied the Chafarinas Islands. France had planned an expedition with the intent of occupying the islands, and making them a part of Algeria, but the Spaniards arrived first.

During the 1850's, there was open hostility between Spain and the tribes surrounding Melilla. In 1859, Spain defeated Morocco (O'Donnell's War), and forced its rulers to pay a large indemnity. Spain also took advantage of the opportunity to enlarge the territory it held around Melilla and Ceuta to make it more defensible. During the 1880's, all of the European powers were moving to obtain what was left unclaimed in Africa, and Spain gained the barren Rio de Oro (now Western Sahara, or southern Morocco) and some of the southwest Morocco.

Between 1891-94, the tribes of the Riff besieged Melilla. The Spaniards sent 25,000 men in response to what has been termed a "minor police action", [Ref. 64]. This action took place during a time when the remainder of Spain's colonies in the Americas were in political upheaval. The "over-officered" army had 29 generals for the force of 25,000 men, [Ref. 65]. The Spanish Army did not want to lose Melilla.

Shortly afterward, in 1898, Spain suffered defeat in the Spanish-American War, and total collapse overseas, losing its territories in the Caribbean and the Philippines. These losses were a crushing blow for the Spaniards in general, and the Army in particular, and further reinforced the Army's large stake in North Africa.

European Imperialism peaked at this time, and 1898 was also the year of the British/French confrontation at Fashoda in central Africa. The British were attempting to link their northern and southern areas of influence at Cairo and Cape Town. The French were trying to do the

same to their western and eastern areas of control in Africa, in French West Africa, and French Somaliland. Spain's losses in the Caribbean and Pacific placed it in a set of circumstances in which it diligently could redirect its efforts to the south, i.e., to Morocco and northwest Africa. It was here that the Spanish State and the Army determined to make a stand, and to reverse Spain's continued decline.

In Morocco, Spain had to contend with France which was already firmly entrenched in Algeria to the east. If this were not enough, Germany, which also was getting interested in African territory, found Morocco attractive, especially since the French had aggressively attached themselves there. This German sensitivity and boistrousness, and French aggressiveness, led to the first Moroccan crisis in 1905-06. The Algeciras Conference of 1906 gave Spain and France general responsibility for Morocco, under a general agreement in favor of an economic open door.

By 1909, the garrison at Melilla was enlarged to 90,000 troops in response to tribal attacks. (Contrast this with the present day population of about 60,000, with 10,000 troops.) The Army did not intend to lose this area. A "last stand" mentality apparently had developed. Commencing in 1909 and continuing until 1926, the Riff Wars were externally the major driving force for Spain, which stayed neutral during World War I, and held on to Spanish Morocco.

A second Morocco crisis came in 1912-13 with the German gunboat Panther appearing off Casablanca after the French had sent troops to the modern capital of Morocco. In 1912, a Spanish Protectorate was established over northern Morocco. For the first time, the strongholds of Ceuta and Melilla, which had been Spanish for 300 and 400 years,




Photo 11. Cover of España en sus Héroes. (One of a 28 issue set of Spanish military history magazines, published in 1969. At least 20 of the issues deal with the Riff Wars (1909-26). Spain remained neutral in World Wars I and II. The heroes of the Civil War are mentioned only briefly. Those issues were unavailable. The Spanish heroes of the 20th century, therefore, come from the Riff Wars.




Photo 12. Cover of España en sus Héroes. (Another cover depicting 20th century heroes.)

ESPAÑA EN SUS HEROES

Nº20



HISTORIA BÉLICA
DEL SIGLO XX

BUZIAN: EL MORO LAUREADO

Photo 13: Cover of España en sus Heroes. (Depicting Riff coast.)



Photo 14. Back Cover of España en sus Heroes. (Officer and soldiers of the voluntary militia of Ceuta - 1913.)

respectively, had substantial frontier areas behind them. The task of the Army was to pacify the surrounding areas and the Riff tribes. This was much more difficult, and much less economically productive for the Spaniards than it was to be for the French in central Morocco.

At home, the "international last stand" mentality of the Army hierarchy was offset by what Atkinson describes as "the unpopularity of service in Africa, and liberal denunciation of this 'policy of conquest' [which] provided the constant scope for agitation," [Ref. 66]. The Riff tribes were led by the infamous Abd el Krim. In 1921, with Spaniards convinced that the situation in the Protectorate was reasonably under control, a massive uprising in which a force of 20,000 Spaniards was nearly destroyed, or "pushed into the sea at Melilla", dealt a staggering blow at home. A total of 70,000 troops were sent to put down the revolt. In 1926, Abd el Krim surrendered, and with this act came the end of a costly war. After this successful African campaign, the Army was more powerful at home than it had ever been since the 1898 humiliation, [Ref. 67].

Ten years later, Melilla and Ceuta were to be decisive again. In 1936, Ceuta was the launching point for Franco's expedition into Spain. Melilla was the first Spanish city to rise against the Republican Government of Spain.

The three years of Civil War (1936-39) which followed nearly destroyed Spain. The country remained neutral in World War II, with the exception of a division-sized force of volunteers which fought on the side of the Germans on the Eastern Front. In the ten years from 1946 to 1956, Spain continued to have problems in the Protectorate, as did France. The Spanish had little choice other than to follow the lead

of the French, and granted independence to Morocco in 1956. Spain, however, retained the enclaves, where Spanish presence, except for Chafarinas, dated back to the first 200 years after the last Moslems were forced to give up their dominions in Iberia in 1492. Spain also retained its acquisitions in the south, namely Spanish Sahara, Ifni, and the Tarfaya region, which dated to the 1880's.

B. CURRENT SITUATION

In 1958, Spain lost the Tarfaya. In 1969, Spain gave up Ifni. In 1976, 20 years after Morocco had gained independence, Spain gave up Spanish Sahara. Each time Spain relinquished some other colonial territory, the issue of the enclaves would temporarily be suspended by the Moroccans. In 1982, there was nothing else for Spain to give up, except possibly the Canaries, which are more Spanish than Ceuta or Melilla. Spain's contention is that all of these are not colonies, but are part of metropolitan Spain.

The enclaves are the last bastions of Spain in Africa, and indeed, in the world outside Iberia. They are the remaining token of the period which began in 1492 when Spain was able to move from 700 years of being the conquered, to 500 years of being the conquerors. They may represent, for Spain, the beginnings and the endings of her global greatness. Unfortunately, they represent for Morocco, the beginning and ending of foreign domination, and contribute to a well-developed sense of Arab nationalism.

Conflict from the 1975 Spanish Sahara territorial dispute spilled over into the areas of fishing rights and the status of the enclaves. Morocco raised the question of "colonial domination" at the United Nations

in January 1975, comparing the enclaves to Gibraltar, and highlighting Spain's hypocrisy in its contrasting views on each, [Ref. 68].

In early February 1975, Spain's Minister of Information declared that the Spanish Cabinet saw Morocco's position as a threat to Spain's "territorial integrity".

The Cabinet did not take the challenge lightly, and within two days, four Spanish destroyers, three attack transports, a tank-landing ship, two submarines, three marine battalions, and three helicopter squadrons arrived to "show the flag" in Ceuta and Melilla, [Ref. 69].

On 10 February 1975, Morocco's Foreign Minister sent a protest to the United Nations about Spanish ships within Morocco's territorial waters. On 11 February, the ships were withdrawn. On 12 February, Spain's U.N. representative "rejected Morocco's effort to draw a parallel with Gibraltar, claiming that the enclaves were historically and demographically part of Spain, while Gibraltar had no similar relationship with the British nation", [Ref. 70].

Furthermore, it was argued that the enclaves predated the Spanish Protectorate, and were administered separately. Morocco had signed numerous agreements since gaining independence in 1956, less than 20 years prior, which recognized the continued sovereignty of Spain over the enclaves.

The Spanish Cabinet also ordered 14 million pesetas (about a quarter of a million dollars in 1975) for development of the enclaves, and the representative from Ceuta said it would be put to use immediately.

In April 1975, the Sahara resistance movement (Morehab) sent messages to the U.N., O.A.U., and the Arab League protesting "Spanish oppression of Moroccans living in the enclaves", [Ref. 71]. On

28 April 1975, the Arab League stated that it supported Morocco's claims regarding Ceuta and Melilla.

In May 1975, three bombs injured 12 Spaniards in a cafe in Melilla. In June, a bombing in Ceuta killed one and injured two others. Another bombing resulted in property damage only. Later, in June, two men were killed while they reportedly tried to plant a bomb near the Shell depot in Melilla. Subsequently, 36 Moroccans were ordered out of Ceuta because of their Moroccan Government connections. Rabat Radio reported that about 400 Moroccans were arrested, and 160 Moroccan families expelled. [Ref. 72]

Tensions were reduced with the resolution of the Spanish Sahara dispute. Possibly secret agreements were concluded with regard to the enclaves. From 1976 to 1981, only periodic incidents have interrupted the status quo at the enclaves. In February 1979, two bombs exploded in Melilla. In May 1979, there was a bomb incident in Ceuta. Moroccan patriotic organizations took credit for both of these.

During late 1979, Morocco made an attempt to stop the flow of goods smuggled from Ceuta. In December 1980, then Spanish Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez made visits to Ceuta and Melilla, which "Morocco regarded . . . as an act of extreme provocation", [Ref. 73].

On a much higher level, with the exception of some fishing disputes, Spanish/Moroccan relations have been generally good since 1976. Joint projects have included a joint Africa-to-Europe bridge commission, arms exchange, fisheries assistance grants, and cultural exchanges. King Juan Carlos has visited Morocco, and King Hassan II has been in Spain. Glorious statements of friendship have been made by the heads of both nations. Still, on 1 June 1981, King Hassan II stated at a

press conference: "Morocco must once and for all say the Sahara is ours, including Sebta (Ceuta) and Mellilla (Melilla), as it has always been throughout history." [Ref. 74]

The Mediterranean has turned into a dividing line between the Christians of Europe on the northern shores, and the Moslems of North Africa and the Middle East on the southern and eastern shores. The movement of the early Moslems across Africa, and into Iberia, was a westward and northward surge, circumferentially around the Mediterranean. The reconquest of Spain pushed the Moslems out of Western Europe, with a southward movement. As if in reaction to the Spanish expulsion of the Moors, on the opposite side of the Mediterranean, the Ottoman Turks were making a northward and westward surge into Europe. With the fall of the Ottoman Turkish empire during the 19th and early 20th centuries, and the eventual postwar independence gained by each of the North African countries, Islamic political resurgence seemed to be making another westward movement across the southern Mediterranean shore.*

The Spaniards may see the rise in Arab nationalism and Arab economic power gained through control of oil in the 20th century as a modern day surge in which Spain may again, somehow, be swept up. The holding of the enclaves could represent a last subconscious attempt on the part of the Spaniards to symbolically avoid the beginnings of a new reconquest.

Coincidentally, the Spanish closing of the Gibraltar land frontier to Spanish dayworkers in 1969, brought on the requirement for Moroccan

*The Moslem surges circumferentially around the Mediterranean, and the eventual division of Christian and Moslem domains at the Strait of Gibraltar and the Bosphorus were described by Associate Professor D. P. Burke in lectures on the Mediterranean Security at the Naval Postgraduate School in January 1982.

dayworkers to fill those jobs in Gibraltar. Moroccans now work at formerly Spanish jobs in Gibraltar, the site of the original Moslem landing in 711.

IV. SPAIN AND MOROCCO COMPARED

A. A STRATEGIC-GEOGRAPHIC COMPARISON

A brief, general comparison of Spain and Morocco emphasizes the relative similarities and differences between the two countries. Some of the major areas of each country are compared in a very general fashion, i.e. geography, people, technology, mineral resources, and industrial development. These areas combine to determine largely the present and potential political-military significance of each country.

1. Pure Geography

Both Spain and Morocco are located at the extreme corners of their separate continents. Spain shares with Portugal the Iberian peninsula in the southwestern part of Europe. Morocco is located at the far northwestern corner of North Africa.

Morocco is the westernmost Islamic country. It shares a mid-Eastern culture with the other Arab States. Separation from the center of their respective continents and cultural spheres has made each country slightly different than the mainstream of European culture, or the mainstream of Arab culture. Spain always has been set apart from Europe geographically by its peninsular location, and by the Pyrenees. It continues this difference today as one of the last major countries in Europe to join NATO and the EEC, and the associated western democracies. Morocco is separated from the rest of Africa by the Sahara, and from the rest of the north African countries by the Atlas Mountains. It is far from Mecca, the center of Islam.

Peninsular Spain occupies a latitude band similar to that stretching from Eugene, Oregon, to Monterey, California. With the Canaries included, Spain extends to the same latitude as the spur of Baja California (Point Eugenia).

Morocco and the Sahara occupy the same latitude band as that stretching from Monterey to the southern tip of Baja California. Spain and Morocco are, for the most part, situated between the Prime Meridian, and ten degrees west longitude. Both countries have coasts along the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, although Spain's Atlantic coastal continuity is broken by Portugal. Morocco's Mediterranean coastal continuity is broken by Spain's enclaves.

Spain occupies an area of 195,000 square miles, and is, therefore, the second largest country in Europe after France (with 212,000 square miles). Spain is roughly in the shape of a square, with sides measuring about 400 nautical miles. Six hundred miles off the southwest coast, and 100 miles off the east coast, are the island groups of the Canaries and the Balearics, respectively. Spain occupies five-sixths of the Iberian Peninsula.

Morocco's area is 172,000 square miles. With the Sahara's 102,000 square miles, Morocco totals 274,000 square miles.* Morocco

*By comparison, California is 159,000 square miles. Texas is 267,000 square miles. To gain an appreciation for the size of Morocco, consult Morocco, a Country Study, p. ix. It depicts Morocco as comparable in size and shape to the combined states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Kentucky, with some slight overlap into the neighboring states (p. ix). A map of Morocco superimposed over a map of the eastern U.S. shows the Strait of Gibraltar would be at Buffalo, and Morocco's southern border at Nashville, Tennessee. When the Sahara is added, Morocco stretches from Buffalo to Houston, Texas.

is less than 90 nautical miles wide at the narrowest point, and 300 nautical miles at its widest point. Morocco is dominated by mountains, and "has the most extensive river system in North Africa", [Ref. 75]. Most of the population lives in the valley lowlands of northwestern Morocco. The Sahara is flat, thinly populated, and a desert frontier. Morocco has a largely undefined border with Algeria in the east, which is mostly mountains and desert. The Sahara borders on Mauritania and Algeria.

2. People

Morocco proper has 20 million people, [Ref. 76]. It has a population density of 155 people per square mile.* Spain has a population of 38 million, and a population density of 192 people per square mile, [Ref. 77]. Morocco's birth rate is among the world's highest with more than three percent rate of natural increase (greater than 40 births per thousand people). The population is expected to reach 23.5 million by 1985, [Ref. 78]. Spain's birthrate, by contrast, is moderately low, at between one and two percent natural increase (between 16 and 24 births per thousand population.) (The world average is 12 per 1,000.) Over half of Morocco's population is under 20 years old, [Ref. 79]. Morocco has a literacy rate of less than 30 percent. By contrast, Spain's literacy rate is greater than 90 percent. (World average is 65 percent, [Ref. 30].)

Spain's predominant religion is Roman Catholic. There are about 26,000 Protestants, and 1,000 Jews in Spain, [Ref. 81].

*Comparison: California has 22 million people, and 144 persons per square mile.

Almost the entire populace of Morocco is Sunni Moslem. Morocco has about 70,000 Christians, and about 30,000 Jews, [Ref. 82]. Castilian Spanish is the language in Spain, with Catalan spoken in the northeast, Basque in the north, and Galician in the northwest. Arabic is the official language in Morocco. There is a large Berber minority as well, which speaks various dialects of Berberic, a language of the Hamitic group.

Morocco's gross national product per capita is in the \$400 to \$1,200 range. In contrast, Spain's is in the \$2,400 to \$4,800 range. These figures are for the urban population, as defined by each country. (World average equals \$2,040, [Ref. 83].)

3. Technology

To obtain a comparison of Spain and Morocco technologically, a number of isolated areas have been used. There is little question that Spain is much more technologically advanced than Morocco, but comparative differences are helpful to see the magnitude. (See Figure 1.)

Although Figure 1 records somewhat isolated comparisons, in each case Spain has at least a two-to-one technological advantage over Morocco. It is interesting to note that Spain has a two-to-one population advantage over Morocco as well. In the case of energy production, Spain produces over 25 times more energy than Morocco.

4. Natural Resources

A lack of water has been a problem for Morocco. Even with its river system, droughts have caused poor harvests during successive years since the mid-1970's. Morocco has 96 square miles of inland water.

Area of Comparison	Year	Spain	Year	Morocco
Roads	1977	146,000 km	1978	56,200 km
Paved		46,100 km		27,700 km
Railroads	1980	13,533 km	1978	1,756 km
Electrified		4,956 km		708 km
Cars (private)	1980	7,556,511 *	1979	413,043 **
Production Energy	1979	105,779 million kwh *	1979	4,105 million kwh
Cement	1979	26.13 million t *	1978	2.82 million t **
Sulphuric Acid	1979	2,950 thousand t *	1976	57 thousand t **

Figure 1. Isolated Technological Comparisons of Spain and Morocco.

Source: Paxton, John, Statesman's Year-Book 1981-82,
**The Middle East and North Africa, pp. 622, 625.
*Europa Year-Book, pp. 1081, 1088.

Spain has over 2,000 square miles of inland water. In terms of soil and land use, Spain has 122,000 square miles of agricultural land.* Agricultural land in Morocco totals 78,000 square miles,** [Ref. 84].

Both countries are well-endowed with minerals. Morocco is rich in minerals, and much of its potential remains untapped. Neither country, however, has great quantities of oil or gas. Morocco has started a program to encourage offshore oil exploration, which could have a positive impact on its imported oil situation in the next decade. Morocco has one principal mineral--phosphate--of which it is the world's leading exporter. Indeed, Morocco is third only to the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of overall production. Morocco has over 70 percent of the world's phosphate reserves. (See Appendix A for a comparison of some of the significant minerals produced by each country.)

5. Production

Agriculture is important to both countries. Although both have been agriculturally strong, and able to feed their own people, Morocco has been hurt by poor harvests, and its high population growth. In 1980, less than 18 percent of the Spanish work forces were in the agricultural sector, down from over 25 percent in 1970. Agriculture contributed less than 10 percent of the GNP of Spain in 1980, while

*This includes arable land, land under permanent crops, and permanent meadows and pastures. An additional 59,000 square miles is forest and woodland. Only 12,000 square miles of Spain's land is classified as "other land", meaning of little or no agricultural value.

**The amount of forest and woodland in Morocco is 20,000 square miles, and "other land" is 74,000 square miles.

industry provided 36 percent. By contrast, "agriculture is the key to the economy of Morocco" according to the Middle East and North Africa, 1981-82, [Ref. 85]. Over half of the working population is engaged in agriculture. "In the past, Morocco has been largely self-sufficient in food stuffs, but population growth is fast outpacing increases in production." [Ref. 86] Morocco remains one of the leading citrus exporters in the world. EEC membership for the major citrus producing countries of Spain, Portugal and Greece may have cumulative bad effects on Morocco's citrus exports.

Spain is continuing to grow in terms of industrial and manufacturing production. Spain's semi-finished and finished products industries are making varied comebacks after rapid growth in the 1960's, followed by a leveling off in the 1970's, and the negative impact of worldwide recession. "By 1980, the car industry was the country's largest employer, and Spain had become the world's seventh largest producer of cars. In 1981, output began to fall." [Ref. 87] Spain has launched programs to revitalize its steel, shipbuilding, textile and mining industries. In 1978, shipyards in Spain launched over one million BRT of ships. The auto industry in 1978 built nearly 1.5 million vehicles, one million of which were passenger cars. Spain's chemical industry is growing.

Morocco has no comparable industrial production of finished products. The country is making advances in the semi-finished product area, especially in processing of phosphate rock into fertilizers, and various acid concentrates, by local beneficiation and subsequent fertilizer production. A large plan for a major steel complex at Nador,




Figure 2. A Strategic-Geographic Comparison

south of Melilla, has been on-again off-again for years. Oil refining, textiles, metal industries, and a car industry all are in their early stages.

B. MILITARY COMPARISON

Spain's 1979 GNP was \$197 billion. Morocco's GNP, in contrast, was \$15.2 billion, less than one-tenth that of Spain. Spain spent \$4.8 billion on defense in 1979. As a percent of the GNP, this is 2.4. Morocco spent \$676 million on defense in 1979, which is 4.4 percent of GNP. Although Spain spent the same amount in pesetas on defense in both 1979 and 1981 (337 billion pesetas), the 1981 figures for defense spending equals \$3.98 billion--down 17 percent from two years earlier, due to inflation. Whereas for Morocco, defense spending in dollars has doubled, to \$1.2 billion. In local currency, dirham, the defense spending increased by 23 percent. These figures do not include military aid from the Saudis, nor from the U.S., which would increase the overall amount of defense spending in Morocco, [Ref. 88].

Spain's total armed forces are 342,000; Morocco's 120,000. Figures for Morocco's total armed forces may be higher. Robin Knight states in U.S. News and World Report that "the Army--one of Africa's most professional--has doubled in size to more than 150,000 in the last six years", [Ref. 89]. Spain's Army has 255,000 men; Morocco's Army has 107,000 according to IISS. Spain has 880 tanks, with 100 more on order; Morocco has 260 tanks with 108 more on order.

Spain's Navy has 49,000 men; Morocco's has 5,000. Spain has 28 major combatants, including eight submarines, one aircraft carrier, 12 destroyers, and 16 frigates. Morocco has two frigates, and four

landing ships. Morocco also has four Lazaga-class frigates with Exocet on order. Spain has a marine force of 10,000 men, with 32 medium tanks.

Spain's Air Force has 38,000 men, and 193 combat aircraft. Morocco's Air Force has 8,000 men, and between 75 and 90 combat aircraft. Spain has 24 Mirage F-1Bs, and between forty and 120 F-18s on order. Morocco has 20 F-5Es on order, [Ref. 90].

Generally, Spain's military is characterized by bureaucracy, whereas due to the Saharan conflict, Morocco's army is more combat experienced. Both countries have excellent Air Forces. The Spanish Navy has significant superiority in numbers and firepower over the Moroccan Navy.

With this comparison of the two countries complete, a description of the following internal and external issues of each country puts the enclave issue in lesser perspective relative to other major concerns.

C. SPAIN'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS

A variety of concerns in domestic Spain compete for the attention of the government, and of the people. The threat posed by its southern neighbor, and the importance of the NATO issue are only some of the concerns of Spaniards, and they do not rank as major ones. Certain issues have a much higher priority. Three issues seem clearly to rank above the rest:

1. Unemployment and the economy;
2. Democratic Process and public administration reform;
3. Counter-terrorism and public safety.

Beyond those top three, it is difficult to rank the other issues, but certainly the following would be of major concern:

1. The aftermath of the military trial of the February 1981 coup plotters;
2. NATO integration;
3. Military leaders and military missions. After 40 years of military dictatorship, this issue will remain for some time to come;
4. Regional autonomy, and the autonomy pacts. The Basques in northern Spain, and the Catalans around Barcelona, are the most autonomous, and also the most industrial, commercial, and prosperous;
5. The Socialist's rise to power, and how successful they will be at solving Spain's problems;
6. Energy: oil, nuclear, coal.

The priorities in the above listed issues obviously change depending on the part of the country, or the segment of society concerned. The Socialist victory, and the emergence of two moderate left and right wing parties is likely to have little major impact on the steady course of Spain's democratic growth. The military, and the discovery of coup plots prior to the October 1982 election, remain a wild card to be dealt with. Any major crises regarding these priority issues could unduly shift Spanish national attention to that crisis issue. This potentially would put Spain in a vulnerable situation in regard to the enclaves. Any corresponding challenges by Morocco to the status of the enclaves, either militarily, economically, or socially, could then send shock waves through Spain, because of the military's close association with the enclaves, [Ref. 91].

D. MOROCCO'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS

The Riff Coast development and the return of the enclaves are not a major area of concern for Morocco in late 1982. Morocco has many major problems with which it must work. Some, unfortunately, are out of Morocco's control. The three main areas of concern in Morocco are:

1. The war in the Sahara;
2. The effects of the world recession on the Moroccan economy;
3. Poor harvests.

These are followed by a myriad of other problems whose significance varies from week to week, and from one sector of the population to another. Generally, they are: variable phosphate prices and markets, education, industrialization, urbanization and population control, the succession of the King, political freedom and democracy, parliamentary elections (which are scheduled in 1983), possible growth of Moslem fundamentalist extremism, and student unrest.


The recession-related problems include: unemployment, the effects of high imported oil prices and energy costs in general. "Despite [an] array of economic and social problems, defense spending has remained the priority of priorities", [Ref. 92]. The King has enjoyed the support of the two left-wing parties, the Istiqlal and the UNFP (Union nationale de force populaires), because of the war. It is the war which stands in the way of accomplishing many of the tasks which Morocco so desperately needs to do. Although many people in Morocco look on a negotiated settlement in the Sahara as unacceptable if it includes territorial concessions, some type of settlement seems to be the only way to allow the Moroccan Government to redirect its full efforts to

its other problem areas. While the country is tied up in the Sahara, there is little time to spend on the enclave issue. It is neither the intent nor the desire to do more than state that the war which began in 1975-76 is the major concern in Morocco, and little can be accomplished in other areas because of the current stalemate situation.

The likelihood of a conflict between the two countries over these small pieces of territory seems remote in late 1982. There are three main reasons for this:

1. Spain's demonstration of resolve with regard to staying in the enclaves;
2. King Hassan's moderating influence in Morocco;
3. Above all, Morocco's stalemated war in the Sahara against the Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia al Hamra and Rio de Oro).

There are other reasons as well, but they likely play lesser or complimentary roles to the above. The degree to which the two countries have cooperative ventures and mutually beneficial compromises largely determines the potential for conflict, or its avoidance, especially with regard to the enclaves.



Map 13. Morocco as Shown on Official Tourist Brochure. (Note all of Western Sahara is included. Boundary with Algeria largely undefined.)

V. SPAIN, MOROCCO AND THE SUPERPOWERS

A. INTERACTION BETWEEN SPAIN AND MOROCCO

It is very difficult to assess effectively the relations between Spain and Morocco. When asked by the author of this thesis in September 1982, U.S. Embassy officials in both Rabat and Madrid indicated that there are no major areas of cooperation between Spain and Morocco. This response was followed by statements that the Kings of the two countries are close personal friends, visit each other, and are often on the telephone discussing mutual problems. This high level contact demonstrates in principle the importance that each monarch places on his close neighbor across the Strait.

The areas of tension and competition between the two countries are more easily isolated than the areas of cooperation. Five major points of tension or competition are: fishing rights and disputes, the enclaves, Spain's unclear political stand regarding the Sahara conflict and the Polisario, off-shore oil potential between the Canaries and the coast of Morocco, and competition for European markets, especially in the citrus trade. Some of these are discussed further below.

In an attempt to come up with areas of cooperation, the following have been isolated: trade, tourist transit, possibly land transit of people and goods to Western Europe, high level political cooperation, some fishing agreements, and future Strait of Gibraltar bridge plans. Many of these cooperative ventures are more compromises or tradeoffs for the benefit of one side or the other rather than mutually beneficial agreements.

The Moroccan News Summary, published bi-monthly by the Embassy of Morocco in Washington, D.C., usually has a section on "Relations between Spain and Morocco." One gets the impression that most of the benefits from the relations are in Morocco's favor. The Spanish try to hold onto what they have. A quote from the Koran seems to fit Morocco's position on Spanish-Moroccan relations: "Act in a way that will lead your enemy to consider you as a friend."

Fishing, as noted above, is both a source of tension between the two countries, and a source of collaboration. The Spanish fishing fleet is large, and its expertise is eagerly sought by the Moroccans. Morocco considers Spanish fishing technology a fair exchange, for it is the rich seafood resources off of the Moroccan Atlantic coast which are among those the Spaniards traditionally have exploited. These fishing grounds correspond with the Gibraltar Strait-Canary Islands axis of Spain, and are around the Canary Islands themselves. The fact that the Canaries are located 50 miles off the Moroccan coast contributes to the tensions associated with the fishing rights, especially in light of the establishment of a 200 mile economic zone by the Moroccans. The Canaries represent a rather large hole in that economic zone. Fishing cooperation is, therefore, blocked to a large extent by fishing disputes between the two countries, and the conflict of interests associated with them. As noted below, however, there has been a large increase in Spanish seafood imports from Morocco.

The desire to reach a fishing settlement apparently has carried over into the citrus competition between the two countries. A Moroccan-Spanish fishing agreement in 1979 allegedly included a

secret clause regarding overland transit of Moroccan citrus fruit via Spain to the rest of Europe, [Ref. 93]. It apparently was secret because such an agreement no doubt undercuts Spain's own citrus export market. There have been conflicting reports regarding the volume of such transit of Moroccan goods to Europe through Spain. Spain's eventual entry into the EEC will hurt the Moroccan citrus trade when the Spanish citrus industry gains EEC trade preference.

Conflict of interests between the two countries continues with regard to the enclaves. As mentioned previously, while Hassan is in power, this likely will remain a diplomatic debate unless there is a major humiliating turn in the Sahara conflict. If there is a failure, or even an eventual successful settlement in the Sahara, the enclaves are the next likely Moroccan target. The post-independence advance of Morocco has been mainly at the cost of Spain.

It was in this (decolonization) context that Morocco regained its territories after successive negotiations--the northern zone in 1956 from Spain; Tangiers in 1956 from the 12 administrative powers; Tarfaya in 1958 from Spain; Ifni in 1969, again from Spain; and finally (14 November 1975) the Sahara provinces by a tripartite agreement in Madrid. [Ref. 94]

Cooperation between the two countries does exist. One of the major areas is trade. The balance of trade between the two countries continues to illustrate the normal interaction between Spain and Morocco. It is in Spain's favor, although the advantage to Spain has decreased over the last five years. In 1981, Spain exported to Morocco 1.6 times as much as it imported. Imports were \$186 million; exports were \$303 million.* Although these figures show a balance of trade in Spain's

*The 1981 exchange rate was 94.15 pesetas/\$1.

favor, the margin is down from five years earlier when in 1977 Spain had a 2.36:1 advantage, [Ref. 95]. Spain supplies more of Morocco's imports than any other country except France. Between 1977 and 1981, the value of Spanish imports from Morocco nearly doubled with one of the major areas of increase being in seafood. The value of Moroccan-supplied seafood to Spain increased tenfold from 1977 to 1981. But the largest single commodity which Spain imports from Morocco is phosphates. In 1981, phosphates accounted for over three-quarters of the value of Spanish imports from Morocco. The major products Spain supplies to Morocco include iron and steel, vegetable oil and automobiles. Percentages for these commodities are 20 percent, 12 percent, and four percent, respectively. Areas of cooperation between the two countries also include the phosphate mine at Bu Craa in the Sahara, which is 65 percent Moroccan and 35 percent Spanish-owned.

Many tourists bound for Morocco arrive via Spain--one factor from which both countries benefit. This is especially critical for Morocco if it is to continue to attract tourists from the rest of Europe, many of whom drive to Morocco. As noted previously, the number of Moroccan guest workers in European countries, especially in France, has increased greatly since 1977, and many transit to and from Europe via Spain.

Politically, one of the more sensitive issues between Spain and Morocco has been the Spanish policy toward the Sahara conflict. The Spanish Government has been neither solidly for nor against the Moroccan position in the Sahara. Spanish policy has ranged from support of Morocco to defacto recognition of the Polisario. There

have been various meetings and dealings between the Spanish Government and the Polisario to gain the release of Spanish fishermen kidnapped by Polisario guerillas. The Africa Contemporary Record, 1979-80 states that "the main conflict between the two countries concerns Spain's continuing, and agonizing, reappraisal of its attitude to the Sahara", [Ref. 96]. Regarding overall political orientation, however, H. P. Klepak observes:

Spain is comfortable with a conservative, monarchical, pro-Western government in Rabat. King Hassan is clearly comfortable with a centrist, monarchical, pro-Western government in Madrid. [Ref. 97]

The interest of the Spanish Army in Melilla and Ceuta are such that any challenges in the enclaves likely will have reverberations throughout Spain.

Possibly one of the most interesting and unique areas in the discussion of relations between the two is in regard to a bridge or tunnel to link the two countries and their continents. This has received renewed publicity in 1981-82. The Moroccan News Summary dated March 1982 contained a lengthy article concerning the project. One of the comments was:

The construction of such a link would bring great changes to both Spain and Morocco on a political and geopolitical level, as it would to all its users. Morocco would become a part of Europe, and the link would place Morocco, which exports a large amount of fruit and agricultural produce by sea, in direct contact with its clients. [Ref. 98].

The project is being worked on with technical assistance from the French and Japanese. The Japanese tunnel at Seikan will be 33 miles long when completed. That is approximately the length of the proposed Gibraltar Strait tunnel. Planning still is in the very early stage.

Due to the extreme depth of the Strait, the tunnel is expected to be at the shallowest point, not the narrowest point. Therefore, it probably will go from just east of Tangier, to just west of Tarifa. The project, if started, is not expected to be completed until the end of the century. It is not a new idea. A 1964 article in the Economist says that the Spaniards were looking at building such a project on and off since 1369. Groups from Spain, Morocco, France, and Britain were talking about the project in the early 1960's. Capital for the construction of such a project always has been the problem, [Ref. 99]. Should the project ever be completed, it is likely that Morocco would stand to gain the most from it. How much support Spain is willing to put into such a project is unknown, but probably the present talk is little more than lip service. If such a tunnel were to be completed in the location suggested, Ceuta probably would lose much of its attractiveness as an easy entry into Morocco.

The tunnel project exemplifies Spanish-Moroccan relations in general. The project is a good idea on paper. Similarly, there are many good intentions for overall improved relations between the two countries. Both sides would like to see a more mutually beneficial association. Every plan that is developed seems to be more to the benefit of Morocco than to Spain. That is, Spain is of more value to Morocco than Morocco is to Spain. In each case, the agreements seem to be a Spanish concession to retain what Spain already has, rather than of mutual benefit to both parties. As in the case of the bridge, discussions on stronger ties and cooperation will continue, but their results are not expected to come until far in the future.

B. THE UNITED STATES' INTERESTS IN THE REGION

Regional stability and maintenance of good relations with the countries on both sides of the Strait is obviously the goal of United States foreign policy in the region. Spain continues to make great strides as it integrates itself into the Western mainstream after years of isolation. Spain now is in NATO, and it is unlikely that the newly-elected Socialist Government will call for a referendum until late 1983, or early 1984, while it concentrates on other more pressing internal problems. Spain and the U.S. signed another bi-lateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1982 which is scheduled to remain in effect until 1987.

United States relations with Morocco have become increasingly friendly under the Reagan administration. The arms transfers from the U.S. to Morocco are for two purposes according to congressional testimony:

1. The basic purpose of providing them with the equipment is to encourage a negotiation (on the Sahara issue) which we hope will facilitate a political solution of the conflict.
2. The second is . . . that the equipment in its own right has military utility in strengthening the armed forces. [Ref. 100].

The debate as to whether this will be successful or not is heated. One aspect of the debate which surfaced was Spain's position on U.S. arms transfers to Morocco. The question was asked of Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, whether the Spanish Government supported the U.S. arms package to Morocco. The response was:

Although we discussed the sale with the Spanish, we neither requested nor were given their endorsement. Nevertheless, the

Spanish expressed their hope that the sale would contribute to a peaceful solution to the dispute. [Ref. 101].

The Spanish Ambassador to the United States sent a letter to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, House Foreign Affairs Committee, dated 10 March 1980. Two carefully-worded sentences possibly hold a key to the true Spanish position on more arms sales to Morocco:

With the aim of promoting a negotiated settlement from a position of neutrality, the policy of the Spanish Government has been to maintain an embargo on arms to the countries involved in the conflict. Consequently, the Spanish Government has never expressed the opinion that arms sales could contribute to a peaceful solution of the conflict. [Ref. 102]. Emphasis added.

Although this is a negative statement, the implication may be that after a settlement in the Sahara, a better-armed, combat-experienced Moroccan military could turn its enlarged military force on the next irredentist claims--the Spanish enclaves. Although unlikely under Hassan, the scenario is not farfetched under a less moderate future regime. The Ambassador's statement in the context of the "Threat from the South" syndrome certainly makes Spain appear uneasy with the closer U.S.-Moroccan relationship. Generally there is a lack of institutional relationships between the United States and Morocco. This could prove to be detrimental to United States interests in the region after King Hassan.*

*In many ways United States support to Morocco and King Hassan is similar to that given to Iran and the Shah. Both the King and the Shah declared themselves pro-Western. The two situations each have in common a similar lack of institutional support, and an emphasis on support of a man vice a country. In 1982, King Hassan is synonymous with Morocco and vice versa. Without trying to manipulate internal politics, U.S. foreign policymakers should expand support of Morocco beyond the areas of arms transfers into other, more lasting aspects of assistance and cooperation.

C. SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE REGION

The Soviet Union attempted at various levels to discourage the accession of Spain into NATO. This effort was unsuccessful. After Spain joined NATO, official correspondence from the Soviet Foreign Minister stated that the good relations between Spain and the Soviet Union would continue in spite of the accession. It is likely that as Spain is integrated into NATO, Soviet interest and attempts to influence developments in Spain will be only within the overall framework of relations between East and West, [Ref. 103].

Relations between the Soviet Union and Morocco have been of a curious nature. King Hassan II clearly has indicated his pro-Western stance. The Soviets remain interested in Morocco for a variety of reasons. As recently as ten years ago in 1973, military links between the Soviet Union and Morocco were in place to facilitate the transport of 2,000 to 3,000 Moroccan troops aboard Soviet naval ships for the reinforcement of Syria in the six months prior to the October 1973 Middle East war. This was the first time foreign troops had been transported aboard Soviet ships outside Europe. Many things in Morocco have changed since 1973, but the fact that such connections existed to execute the operation is an indication of Soviet willingness to cooperate militarily with Morocco.

The Polisario guerillas are using Soviet weapons in the Sahara. This fact has threatened to sour Soviet-Moroccan relations. The Soviets claim the arms come from the Libyans, and the Algerians, and that the Soviets have no control over these two countries. The Moroccan Government has indicated, nevertheless, that it expects the Soviets to bring pressure to bear over the use of their weapons against Morocco.

Soviet press statements linking the U.S. with Morocco's struggle against the Polisario appear from time to time, however, the Soviets generally have not taken a strong stand on either side of the issue. This seems to be an indication of either lack of interest, a desire not to sour Soviet economic relations with Morocco, or a lack of confidence in the capabilities of the Polisario to win the territory. The Soviets demonstrated an ability to reverse rapidly their support in the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict. Such a shift could occur based on opportunities in the case of support to one of the sides in the Sahara conflict. With King Hassan in power, a shift toward Morocco would not be likely. With a successive Moroccan regime of lesser pro-Western stance, this type of scenario is not so outlandish. Morocco, without a doubt, would be a prize to the Soviets.*

*Many Third World countries make rhetorical statements about turning to the Soviets for aid. A discussion between an American academic and a Moroccan officer illustrates a perception that Soviet military aid would come easily. The discussion occurred in late 1982 between a Naval Postgraduate School professor, lecturing at the U.S. Air War College, and a Moroccan military officer in attendance. The topic of the forum was U.S. arms transfer policies. The Moroccan officer made the statement that the U.S. constantly was making it too difficult to get arms by placing so many restrictions, and allowing so much debate prior to the actual transfer. He contrasted this to the Soviet position, and how easy it was to get such support from them. The professor pointed out that there were certain other requirements that the Soviets place on countries after their transfers. The Moroccans had received Soviet arms, including aircraft, during the late 1950's and early 1960's, and it is possible that there is a lingering impression that those transfers were much freer than the present ones which appear to be under constant close scrutiny by Congress. [Personal interview with Professor Edward J. Laurence, Assistant Professor, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.]

In his article on the Soviet realignment in the Horn of Africa, Steven David concluded:

Since the Soviets had the will and capability to meet these very real security needs while the United States did not, it is not surprising that the Soviets emerged as triumphant as they did. . . . In a conflict such as exists in the Horn (and in many other places throughout the Third World), the introduction of this weaponry and especially of Soviet bloc troops, is enough to decisively tip the balance in the Soviet client's favor. The lesson which emerges is clear: if your country faces a security threat, seek out the Soviets for assistance. [Ref. 104]. Emphasis added.

The Soviets appear to be cautious regarding their relations with Morocco. Painfully aware of their failure in Egypt at the other open-ocean outlet to the Mediterranean, they seem to be patiently waiting and working on a new tack, one that has been observed elsewhere.

Professor Richard Pipes states:

The Soviet economic arsenal is not rich enough to serve as a major weapon of Soviet global strategy. . . . Soviet economic leverage is exercised mainly through military and economic assistance, carefully doled out to countries judged to be of strategic importance. Aid of this kind creates all kinds of dependencies, including the willingness of the recipient to host Communist administrative personnel. It is very instructive to analyze statistics of Soviet economic assistance to Third World countries because the figures give a good insight into the relative importance that Moscow attaches to them. On a per-capita basis, among the greatest beneficiaries of Soviet aid since 1954 have been South Yemen and Afghanistan. More recently, the USSR and its clients have poured vast sums of money into Turkey, a member of NATO, and Morocco. Significant increases in Soviet assistance usually are reliable indicators of Soviet strategic interests in a given area: judging by recent aid patterns, the Mediterranean enjoys very high priority in its mind. [Ref. 105].

In March 1978, Morocco signed what was called "The Contract of the Century" with the Soviet Union. The Soviets are to develop the Meskala phosphate deposit. The Moroccans have guaranteed delivery of enriched phosphate for some 30 years. The contract was referred to by the DMS Market Intelligence Report as "the largest single Soviet

credit to a developing country", [Ref. 106]. The value of the contract has been reported as two to 2.7 billion dollars. The congressional testimony on arms transfers to Morocco and North Africa had the transaction as high as \$30 billion.

The Meskala deposit in Morocco has not been shown to be a rich one. Approximately 100 geologists from the Soviet Union have been in Morocco surveying the area. The contract is to include the mining equipment and technology at the Meskala site, the railroad line to the coast, and a port facility. The phosphates from the mine, and the intermediates (TSP) will be sent to the Soviet Union (ten million tons of TSP concentrate per year). At 1982 prices, it would take about 16 years for the Soviets to get back their investment. At its current rate of development, the mine is not likely to start producing until the 1990's. Production on the contract is planned to go into the first decades of the next century, [Ref. 107]. This is an excellent example of the long term agreements spoken of by Robert Donaldson:

Just as the Soviet leaders learned not to rely on ideology to forge ties in the Third World, so they have become more sophisticated about economic aid. In recent years, the speculative aid projects Khrushchev favored have been abandoned, and Soviet aid and trade agreements are now cast in a longer range framework, institutionalized through bilateral economic commissions, and allowing for greater integration with Soviet and East European plans for development. [Ref. 108]. Emphasis added.

This appears to be the case with Soviet investment and aid to Morocco for the mutual benefit of both countries.

There are two ways of looking at the Soviet phosphate deal. Over the long term, the Soviets will keep close economic ties with geo-strategically located Morocco, even though it is a Western-oriented state.

Morocco's nearly 1,000 mile Atlantic coastline is astride the Persian Gulf/Cape of Good Hope/North Europe oil shipping lanes, and the South Africa/North Europe coal shipping lanes. If the Soviets expect a potential falling out with the West, or an overthrow of King Hassan, the large contract on Moroccan phosphate resources could be an excellent basis for the friendship. Morocco would be important to the Soviet Union under such circumstances.

Alternatively, increased use of phosphate fertilizer is one of the ways for the Soviets to increase their disastrously poor agricultural productivity. Currently, Soviet domestic phosphates are in sufficient quantities. The need for this resource will continue, and the Soviets realize that the main reserves are in Morocco. The Soviets therefore could simply be planning for the future as a shortfall seems likely within the first two decades of the next century.

D. SUMMARY

In summary, the situation appears to be the following between Spain, Morocco and the Superpowers. The United States' interest in Morocco needs to be strengthened institutionally to plan for long term regional stability. The USSR appears to be investing cautiously, and building long term ties to take advantage of a possible post-Hassan shift should Morocco decide to take a less pro-Western stance. Spain, unfortunately, does not appear to benefit substantially from better relations with Morocco. The Spanish apparently continue to see many of Morocco's future gains to continue to be at Spanish expense, especially regarding fishing, the enclaves, and the tunnel. Major emphasis on better Spanish-Moroccan relations will, therefore,

continue to be Moroccan initiatives using the enclaves issue and Atlantic fishing rights as leverage. Spain's interests economically remain directed to the north. Spanish emphasis defensively will remain, at least partially, directed to the south because of the Canaries and the enclaves. A pro-Soviet Morocco would be in the best interests of neither Spain nor the United States. Therefore, the Spanish must pursue more actively policies that not only are in their own interest, but also in the interest of long term stability within a problem-ridden and increasingly military-oriented Morocco.

VI. WORLD ENCLAVES: A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARISON

In the interest of gaining insight into some of the special circumstances of strategic enclaves, a framework is developed below for systematic analysis and comparison of some of the world's enclaves--past and present. There are similarities and differences between the enclaves of the past and those of today.

Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 1979, defines an "enclave" as "a country, or especially, an outlying portion of a country, entirely or mostly surrounded by the territory of another country". Various other sources restrict the definition to "a portion of a country which is separated from the main part and surrounded by politically alien territory", Webster's New World Dictionary. The term enclave seems to apply in a much broader sense to a number of territories or disputed pieces of land around the world.

Modern technology, International Law, and Law of the Sea have given new significance to small pieces of land which suddenly define large tracts of territorial ocean and seabed. Furthermore, as the major countries of the world desire to control the seas and trade to their advantage, small pieces of territory at certain strategic locations facilitate this.

It is in the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica that "enclave" is generally used in a looser sense to describe a "colony or other territory of a state which, while possessing a seaboard, is entirely surrounded landward by the possession of some other power", [Ref. 109].

This general loose sense, modified further by new geo-strategic, international law, territorial sea notions, and modern technological dimensions, is how the term is broadly used here. This broader definition has been given the name "semi-enclave". Many other terms have been separated by G. W. S. Robinson in the Annals of the Association of American Geography, 1959, including "Normal, Pene-, Quasi-, Virtual, and Temporary". He uses the term in the other perspective, i.e., "exclave", [Ref. 110].

In the case of the island enclaves, which is the category of at least two of the three minor places of Spanish sovereignty, the concept of "proximity" to the foreign country, and to the mother country, plays a part. Also the "territorial waters" aspect of the Law of the Sea convention has a role in the discussion. The problems associated with island enclaves in general takes on significant naval implications, especially with regard to resources, commerce, and trade.

By taking the broader definition, which fits more the case of Spain's North African enclaves at the narrow maritime strait or chokepoint, the major problems associated with fully encircled enclaves, i.e., the "problem of access" to the enclave from the mother country, becomes less important. It does, however, remain a factor because of the "territorial waters" concept. The problem of access receives full treatment in F. E. Krenz' International Enclaves and Rights of Passage (Geneva, 1961),* [Ref. 111].

*Krenz uses historical analogy as it applies to fully encircled enclaves of the present and recent past. Krenz says that the question has not been examined in depth until his work. "Is passage considered to be a right in the absence of treaties?" He examines this question

Krenz' conclusions do not fully apply to the Spanish enclaves situation, therefore his discussion of the problem of access is dealt with only peripherally. Much of the Krenz analysis is helpful as an alternate to the independent analytical framework developed here. The goal is to classify enclaves systematically and logically for comparison. This is the type of framework used to gather and interpret available information on the Spanish enclaves, and other enclaves. The purpose of the framework is to determine if analogous situations are, or are not relevant to one another. The analysis also attempts to determine some useful pattern that suggests future problem areas, and any practical payoffs as a guide for U.S. foreign policy. The analysis of the present situations displays the degree of actual existing tensions, and helps to show whether a balance of strength exists, physically or psychologically, with regard to the opposing sides.

A. CONSIDERATIONS FOR CLASSIFICATION

Before the framework was devised, over 30 enclaves, potential enclaves, or analogous situations were listed. Appendix B includes both enclave situations and some analogous non-enclave situations. Some of these non-enclave situations are interesting, because they illustrate similar territorial questions. In a very abbreviated form, the framework appears as follows:

in the context of International Law, custom, and precedence. West Berlin and the problem of access is discussed, but only to a limited extent, with no conclusions drawn (pp. 23-4). He omits Berlin from his study for various reasons. Unfortunately, the building of the Wall, and the printing of his book, occurred in the same year. No followup works have been found.

1. Preliminary Questions

- a. Is there superpower interest?
- b. Is the enclave geo-strategically located?
- c. Are there significant special circumstances?
- d. What is the general state of relations between the mother country and the foreign or enclaving country?

2. Data

- a. Geographical considerations;
- b. Demographic/Ethnic considerations;
- c. Historical/Political/Military considerations;
- d. Economic and resource considerations;
- e. Miscellaneous additional details.

The framework above was devised to look systematically at the most important data. The objective is to look at the most decisive characteristics regarding individual enclaves. The following four preliminary questions tend to establish the decisive characteristics:

First, is there superpower interest? The interest could be in the enclave itself, or a special relationship or concern with either the mother country, or the foreign or enclaving country. The presence of such interest aids in the definition of the overall international significance on the enclave in question.

Secondly, is the enclave geographically strategic? Such strategic importance can be in terms of position, e.g., Gibraltar and Ceuta at a chokepoint, or in terms of strategic resources, e.g., certain island enclaves in the Persian Gulf.

Thirdly, are there significant special circumstances? Long overland or over-water distances can be especially significant, e.g., the past

situation of East and West Pakistan divided by India; the distance between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin; or long ocean distances, in the cases of the Falklands, Hong Kong, and Macao. Although not an enclave in a strict sense, the Falklands are a case of disputed territory much closer to the foreign country, Argentina, than to the mother country, Britain. When coupled with territorial waters, economic zones, continental shelf rights, and Law of the Seas considerations, this makes the Falklands similar to other enclaves, if the word is used in the broadest sense that appears applicable in the late 20th century. These considerations of distance from the mother country would normally be included in geographic considerations, and they significantly can affect psychological perceptions of the states involved, or the dependency of the enclave on the foreign state. In addition, Hong Kong and Macao, for example, have other significant circumstances that alter their cases. An extreme dependence on the foreign country by the enclave would be significant also.

Fourthly, define the mother country and the foreign or enclaving country, and explain the general state of relations between the two. In the case of Greece and Turkey, where there is significant animosity, small problems can be blown out of proportion. In the case of France and Britain, small problems likely are to be overlooked in the interest of larger cooperation. In the case of Argentina and Britain, however, relations seemed to be good with the exception of the Falklands/Malvinas dispute. The question of the general state of relations must be put in the context of other events and considerations as well. Internal problems, alliance and bloc associations, economics, and type and stability of government are a few of these other considerations.

After the above preliminary questions are answered, the Data portion of the framework may supply other significant inputs. The first set of hard data concerns Geographical Considerations which include:

1. Location, as amplifying data for the geo-strategic question above;
2. Proximity, i.e., what is the distance of the enclave from the mother country, and from the foreign country?;
3. Contiguity, i.e., is the enclave contiguous, or is it an island?;
4. Area in square miles.

The second set of data in regard to Demographic and Ethnic Considerations includes:

1. Population (total number of people);
2. Demography;
3. Ethnic composition;
4. Language;
5. Religion;
6. Current and former relations with the mother country, and with the enclaving country. Generally any distinct ancestral, cultural, religious, or linguistic characteristics of the enclave are developed in this category.

The third set of data, Historical/Political/Military Considerations includes:

1. Date of acquisition of the enclave by the mother country;
2. Length of time enclave has been part of the mother country, and how long, if ever, the territory had been part of the enclaving country;
3. How much conflict has there been, and when was the last major conflict?;
4. The general nature of relations over the issue of the enclave, whether hostility, peaceful cooperation, national debate, or U.N. debate;

5. What are the present defenses which the mother country has in place on the enclave, especially in numbers of troops and significant arms?

The fourth and final set of data has to do with Economic and Resource Considerations. This set includes:

1. What is the basic makeup of the economy and trade of the enclave? Is it self-supporting?;
2. What are the major industries, and are there any significant resources?;
3. What is the commercial advantage of the enclave to the mother country, and to the enclaving country?;
4. What percent GNP of the mother country does the enclave supply?;
5. What are the import/export figures between the enclave and the mother country, and the enclaving country?

Miscellaneous additional details may be added, such as the presence of a free-port, a rapid decline in population, or significant information regarding health or education in the enclave. Although the framework is fairly simplistic, it sets out the decisive points of consideration, but still allows room for exceptional circumstances. The framework easily can be used to classify and compare. Furthermore, it serves as a basis for discussing systematically the similarities and differences of various enclaves.

B. SAMPLE

In many ways, the previous chapters have been a presentation of the Spanish enclaves in North Africa, and have supplied much of the available information suggested in this framework. Some of the information is obscure, conflicting, or difficult to find. Clearly, some of the items in the framework apply more to some situations than to others. Also, some items are more significant in some situations than in others.

The Canary Islands are used for a brief, illustrative example of the application of the framework.

There is no major superpower interest in the Canaries, but in 1969 the Soviets negotiated for commercial shipping contracts which were granted by Franco. The U.S. and the West realize the geo-strategic significance of the Canaries as they sit astride the Persian Gulf/Cape of Good Hope/Northern European petroleum route, and the South Africa/Northern European coal shipping route. Special circumstances may be considered to be the close proximity of the Canary Islands to Morocco (55 miles), and the relative distance from Spain (650 miles). Relations between Spain and Morocco have been good in general, although differences do exist over certain territories and fishing rights.

Proximity is discussed above, and the impact of this proximity can affect territorial waters as well as economic zone claims and violations. The area of the Canaries is 2,800 square miles, and the population is 1.4 million--almost entirely Spanish. Spanish is the language spoken, and Roman Catholicism is the major religion professed. Relations are closer with Spain than with Morocco, but autonomy, separatism, and independence movements exist.

The Canaries were acquired in 1402 by Spain. There is no indication that they ever belonged to Morocco. Spain has occupied the islands for 580 years. Conflict has centered around fishing boat seizures and territorial waters/economic zone violations, with the last major incidents in 1980. Debate regarding the Canaries was brought up

before the OAU in the late 1970's. Spain maintains a 16,000 man garrison on the islands, as well as naval and air force presence,

and a separate joint command. Economy is primarily tourism and fishing. Trade is more with Spain and northern Europe than with Morocco. An independence movement could be a future factor.

C. WORLD ENCLAVES COMPARED

There are some major groupings of enclaves, or other areas of potential territorial dispute, that share significant similarities. In some cases, these can be considered "enclaves" only in the broadest sense.*

Moroccan arguments over the Spanish enclaves claim geography as a reason why the enclaves should not be Spanish. If this were valid, then any place where a separated territory of one country is closer to another country would be in question. If that were the case, Alaska should be a part of Canada or Russia, rather than the United States. Greenland should be a part of Canada, Iceland, or Britain, rather than under Danish sovereignty.

There are many geographical curiosities around the world which are much more unusual than the Spanish enclaves. Alaska's Alexander Archipelago, the Channel Islands off of France, and Denmark's Bornholm Island (which is closer to Sweden and East Germany than to the Danish mainland) are examples of other geographical and political boundaries which are somewhat anomalous. Some of these are included in Appendix B as examples of the way in which geography is only one territorial consideration. The following groupings include some examples from the Appendix for illustration only, and do not imply that they are enclaves or disputed territories.

*Turkey is an ethnically and geographically Asiatic enclave of Europe. Israel is an enclave in the Arab world. Northern Ireland is an enclave in Ireland.

Those that are geographically in a strategic location include West Berlin, the Canaries, Ceuta, Faeroes, Gibraltar, Guantanamo, and Turkey. Those that had more geo-strategic significance for their area at a time in the past include Bornholm, Cyprus, Memel, Danzig, and Zara. Superpower interest or rivalry is high in the following areas: Berlin, Guantanamo, Israel, and Turkey. Of these two major groups, Berlin is the only one included in each, and, significantly, it has seen superpower confrontation.

A further group may be those that have significant special circumstances. For various reasons, these include Berlin, Canaries, Ceuta/Melilla, Cyprus, Falklands, Faeroes, Gibraltar, Guantanamo, Hong Kong, Israel, and Macao. Those enclaves where there is significant underlying hostility between the mother country and the enclaving country include: Tierra del Fuego, Berlin (Soviet presence), Cyprus, Greek Islands off of Turkey, Guantanamo, Israel, Quemoy/Matsu, and Turkey in Europe. Past enclaves in this category include: Memel/Danzig and East Pakistan. It is interesting to notice that the Falklands, the Faeroes, and Gibraltar do not fall into this category, but conflict has occurred without this association. These enclaves serve as examples of instances where generally good relations and economic ties have not overcome certain events and circumstances. The Spanish enclaves could fit into this category.

Size and population only seem to play a contributory role if they act in concert with other considerations; in other words, if they affect perceptions regarding an enclave, as does distance. But the factors that draw attention seem to be geo-strategic position, resources,

and significant trade. The ethnic factor is important when there exists an underprivileged or persecuted majority, or minority. Examples of cases where ethnic factors exist include Cyprus, Israel, Goa, Northern Ireland, East Pakistan, Turkey in Europe, and potentially Walvis Bay in Namibia.

In each of the instances noted above, the historical and political aspects tend to make the emotions play a more significant part. Such historical and political aspects can, therefore, be an "unknown" factor in a given situation, because of the difficulty of measuring the impact of emotions. It can turn a seemingly stable and possibly even a mutually beneficial situation into just the opposite, e.g., Goa. Some residents of the Spanish enclaves have suggested this would happen in the enclaves if Ceuta and Melilla were turned over to Morocco. The infrastructure of the cities and ports, and the economies would continue to function efficiently for less than five years. After that time, the cities would begin to decline in efficiency, as did Tangier after it was turned over to Morocco by the twelve administrative powers.

Economic factors are significant when the enclave is an outlet for goods from the foreign country. Hong Kong, Macao, Goa (past), and Singapore (past) are examples of such a situation. Resources can be divided into two different areas: land and sea. Herein lies a significant factor for potential future conflict regarding enclaves. This also plays a significant part in explaining why there can be a broader definition for the term enclave in the world today. Land resources have played a part in Goa (manganese). The labor resources of China are tapped by the presence of Hong Kong and Macao, as were those of India by Goa.

Sea resources traditionally have been associated with fish. Fishing boundaries, economic zones, and territorial waters all contribute to expanding the enclave problem. The Law of the Sea [Ref. 112] proposals would make, for example, a ten square mile rock or tip of land into a three, 12, 50, or 200 mile radius restricted zone. Drawing a 50 mile circle or zone around a country vastly increases the territory of either the enclave or the foreign country. This makes the situation similar to the territorial disputes of the past. Rights of ocean passage and usage become an international problem similar to the rights of land passage in the past. Leigh S. Ratiner, in Foreign Affairs, uses the hypothetical example of Spain's noncompliance in the Law of the Seas regarding passage of ships through the Strait of Gibraltar, [Ref. 113]. The same can be said of Moroccan noncompliance in the Law of the Sea over the same strait.

Modern technology allows developed countries to take advantage of resources on the ocean floor, especially the continental shelf. It also puts together the basic factors for a revival of territorial disputes on the scale seen only with regard to land in the past. For territorial waters claims, land claims are crucial, however small they may be. Therefore, modern enclaves take on a peculiar significance. If Norway could claim up to 200 miles off of its coast, it would increase its size by five times. Countries with long coastlines are the winners. Continental countries, or those with irregular coasts are among the losers. This was illustrated by the North Sea oil rights claimed by Netherlands and Denmark to the detriment of Germany. Countries with the remains of former colonial empires also stand to

gain if all of the aspects of the Law of the Seas convention were to take effect. But this would be a major point of contention again between the mother country, and enclaving country. In the case of Spain and Morocco, the ocean boundaries around the Canaries create tension in the area.

Groupings of enclaves with significant sea resources include nearly all with the exception of Berlin. Each of the coastal enclaves, or island enclaves, has potential for such expansion. It is interesting that with this sea outlet, the rights of access problem, the major problem associated with enclaves of the past, is almost eliminated, but a new modern problem of resources arises. When an island enclave is less than six miles off the coast, the traditional three-mile territorial waters limit becomes a problem. If a 50-mile economic zone is declared, the island enclave causes further territorial problems, and even rights of access problems start to reenter the picture.

Examples of economic zones and potential problems with regard to fishing include: Canaries, Ceuta/Melilla, Channel Islands, Corsica, Cyprus, Faeroes, and the Greek islands. Many of those same names come up again for off-shore mineral rights. Significant examples include: Tierra del Fuego, Falklands, and the Greek islands off Turkey. Most of the minor island enclaves of the world have had little or no conflict because of their relative lack of value. Clearly, if oil were discovered off St Pierre/Miguelon, north of Bornholm, east of the Canaries, off the Channel Islands, or off little Kasterllorizon, south of Turkey, the respective enclaving countries of Canada, Sweden, Morocco, France, and Turkey would take notice. The Cod War of the 1970's

between the United Kingdom and Iceland, is a further example of the way tensions between friends can develop over lines drawn from small pieces of land.

D. ANOTHER SCHEME OF CLASSIFICATION

In mid-1982, Robert von Lucius wrote an article which appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine called "Wo gibt es den nächsten 'Falkland-Konflikt'?" ("Where Will We Have the Next "Falkland's Conflict'?"'), [Ref. 114]. His article deals with over 75 pieces of territory, most of which are small, and many of which fit the traditional definition of enclave, if not the broader one used here. Lucius says that the first category of these territorial problems is where some borders are not really defined. For example: Libya/Tunisia, Iran/Iraq, Soviet Union/China, India/China, Guatemala/Belize, and Venezuela/Guyana.

His second category deals with problems over annexation of foreign countries. Examples include parts of Germany that were formerly East Prussia, Estonia/Latvia/Lithuania, the South Kuril Islands, Tibet, East Jerusalem, and Afghanistan. Lucius' next category is islands. He includes Paracel and Spratley Islands in the South China Sea (China, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines all want them), and the Abu Musa and Tumb Kubra and Tumb Sughra in the Persian Gulf (Iran and United Arab Emirates).

Lucius then says that the Falklands are different from these other islands. They represent a category different from all the rest. In this category, there are over 60 areas far from the motherland, most of which are microstates in the Pacific or the Caribbean. Of the mother countries, Britain, France, and the United States have 15

each. Australia, New Zealand, Spain, Portugal, South Africa and the Netherlands have less than 15 between them.

For the most part, there are no problems Lucius says; but there are ten areas where there are significant conflicts of interest. For Britain, these are Hong Kong, Falklands, Gibraltar, and Diego Garcia. The French have two, both off Madagascar: Mayotte and Comoran, and Iles Gloriens. The Portuguese have Macao. The U.S. has Guantanamo. The South Africans have Walvis Bay. Spain has Ceuta and Melilla. (Guantanamo and Walvis Bay are enclaves which are the most similar to Ceuta and Melilla.)

Lucius then says six of these are not so important. The other four, Walvis Bay, Guantanamo, Gibraltar, and Ceuta and Melilla are more important because of their potential for military problems. Although the analysis is somewhat different in its approach and its examples and individual cases are somewhat different from mine, both significantly deal with enclave problems, and in each case, come up with Ceuta and Melilla as enclaves among those with the greatest potential for problems.

E. COMMON INCOMPLETE COMPARISONS OF THE SPANISH ENCLAVES

There are many ways that all of these territorial and enclave situations are similar, and there are many ways that each is different. Only by a complete and systematic analysis of the similarities and the differences can insight be gained by comparison of one enclave or territorial dispute with another. There is always a tendency to think of any one enclave situation as similar in one way or another with other enclave situations with which one is familiar. This can be said of any territorial disputes. Some of the incomplete comparisons that

have been made regarding the Spanish enclaves are discussed below. They present problems in thinking clearly about the particular details, because they consider only one aspect rather than the many facets which must be considered as presented in the analytical framework above.

Ceuta and Melilla have been described as similar to Hong Kong and Macao because they all act as outlets for goods from the hinterland, and are mutually beneficial situations, [Ref. 115]. The Spanish enclaves and Gibraltar have been identified as similar because both have displaced native populations. A learned writer on the Middle East said he thought the Spanish enclaves were similar to the French Departments in Algeria, because they are considered a part of metropolitan Spain. I personally was struck by the appearance of the cities of Ceuta and Melilla--typical Andalucian towns with bullrings, churches, whitewashed buildings, and the like. Also the geographical mirror-image of the two rock capes on opposite sides of the Strait of Gibraltar draws one's attention to that similarity between Ceuta and Gibraltar.

Each of the above analogies is incomplete, drawing only on apparent similarity between two reasonably analogous situations. The comparison to Hong Kong and Macao overlooks the fact that the people of the Spanish enclaves are mostly Spaniards (over 75,000), whereas the residents of Hong Kong and Macao are mostly Chinese. The ethnic population in the case of Hong Kong and Macao is primarily that of the "enclaving" country. The flow of goods is also into the hinterland from the Spanish enclaves, whereas it is in the opposite direction in Hong Kong and Macao. Finally, a question of proximity exists. Whereas Hong Kong and Macao are half way around the world from Britain and Portugal, Ceuta is one

hour by ferry, and within visual contact of mainland Spain. Melilla is only a 30 minute flight from Malaga and Almeria at less than 120 nautical miles away.

There are both similarities and differences between Gibraltar and the Spanish enclaves of North Africa. Geographically, Ceuta and Gibraltar are similar. The displaced native populations argument still is an incomplete analysis, and represents only one facet of the situation. Ceuta has not been Arab for over five centuries. Neither has Melilla been Arab for 485 years. Furthermore, there has been no policy of expulsion. The presence of Moroccan minorities in both Ceuta and Melilla attests to this. There is, however, a policy of exclusion which limits the number of non-Spaniards that can make their residence in Ceuta and Melilla.

Although English is widely spoken in Gibraltar, the language of business and of the home is Spanish. The language of business in the Spanish enclaves is not Arabic by contrast. Chinese is the primary language in Hong Kong and Macao, and thus represents another difference between them and the Spanish enclaves. The Spanish surnames of the residents of Gibraltar are evidence of their constant linkage to Spain even after a 13 year blockade, and 270 years of British possession. Although there is Arab influence in the Spanish enclaves, the Spanish influence is the overwhelming one.

Gibraltar and Ceuta are similar in their geo-strategic position. But the enclaves and Gibraltar are different again because of Britain's distance from Gibraltar of over 800 miles, and Spain's proximity Ceuta of ten miles, with visual contact. Spaniards describe this situation of Spain on two continents as similar to the way in which Turkey is on

two continents separated by a narrow strait. The Greece/Turkey situation has many more similarities: Geographic proximity, centuries of occupation and domination by one country of the other, and vice versa, and friction in the form of Moslem culture versus Christian culture.

It is in the ethnic factor and the centuries of occupation variously by one culture of the other that the analogy of Spanish enclaves to the French Departments breaks down. Algerians did not occupy France for seven centuries. Although the Moors did invade southern France in the 700's, they were swiftly pushed back. The conquest of Algeria was as a part of the 19th century age of colonialism and imperialism, not as a part of a reconquest comprising centuries of territorial warfare. The proximity of France to Algeria is different again as it is 400 miles across the Mediterranean to Algeria, and not simply across a narrow strait or the Alboran Basin. Size and ethnic makeup are another difference. The Departments were large. The enclaves are small. Ethnically only one-tenth of the population of the departments was European. Close to three-quarters of the population of the Spanish enclaves are ethnic Spanish. Finally, another difference is that NATO included the French Departments in the original treaty. The Algerian revolution was considered a domestic affair. NATO has excluded the Spanish enclaves, even though they were Spanish long before the Departments were French. The concept that the enclaves are not on the North Atlantic, and therefore cannot be covered, is a specious argument. Italy is not on the Atlantic, and has no common border with a Warsaw Pact country, yet it is included for obvious other reasons. The Canary Islands of Spain are covered as a part of NATO, yet they are geographically an island archipelago of continental Africa. Their

position in the North Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer makes the rationalization easier, and their strategic location and importance to Spain makes their inclusion unquestionable. Yet, the Spanish enclaves, much to the chagrin of NATO's first new member since 1955, are excluded.

Ceuta and Melilla, although located in Africa, have a Spanish Andalusian appearance. Many Moroccan towns have an Andalusian appearance, even as far south as around Rabat, which was in the French Protectorate, not the Spanish. The reason is because the native Moors settled there and built various towns with their whitewashed structures after the expulsion from their "native" Andalucia. It is here that one starts to see some subtle differences in the enclaves, and the territorial disputes between Spain and Morocco. The 1400 years of being variously "the conqueror" and "the conquered" are not erased with the U.N. decolonization declaration which actually was aimed more at the acquisitions of the pre-World War I age of imperialism than at the conquests of five centuries ago.

As with all reasonable analogies, there are similarities which if taken far enough, ultimately break down. In fact, if comparisons and analogies are used, and the questions "How are these situations similar?" and "How are they different?" are not systematically answered, one can draw wrong conclusions, or at least conclusions based on incomplete data. Analogies can and should be used to discuss, analyze, and gain insight into various enclave situations and territorial disputes. The limitations and differences of each analogy must be understood and presented to avoid confusion and disastrous misrepresentation. The systematic framework for comparison is devised to facilitate such

comparison, and to bring out the major similarities as well as the major differences.

The enclave situations between Spain and Morocco are far more similar in most respects to Walvis Bay in Namibia, Guantanamo in Cuba, and the Greek/Turkish dispute. This is much more the case than any analogy drawn to Gibraltar, Hong Kong, or Macao. Answers and insights are therefore gained more by comparison to these situations than to others. When analyzed in terms of superpower interest, geo-strategic location, special circumstances and relations between the mother and the enclaving countries, the potential for problems and the difficulty of finding acceptable and easy solutions becomes much more apparent. The geographical, ethnographic, historical, political, and military aspects of the Spanish enclaves have striking similarity to those of the Greek and Turkish dispute. To arbitrarily support one side or the other in a debate such as this is to be insensitive to a myriad of details which could negatively affect either country in the debate.

F. GENERAL ENCLAVE AND TERRITORIAL CONSIDERATIONS

The thousands of land enclaves of the past have almost disappeared, and with them the active acceptance of conventional rights of passage. For places like West Berlin, the movement of troops, supplies, equipment, trade, people, communications, air transit, river transit, and land access remains a one-of-a-kind situation. A tailored solution must continuously be worked out for this problem that was commonplace as recently as the past two centuries. The Berlin Agreement of 9 November 1972 has regulated many of these factors. Armies in the past naturally traversed the territory of others to get to their enclaves. Rights of passage agreements were worked out.

The new enclave problem of today is not so much one of being land-locked. It is one where International Law and Law of the Sea impact on large and small remnants of past empires. These modern-day enclaves can widen existing differences, and can serve as a springboard for plunging countries into larger confrontations. These outlying areas around the world have coastal and water access. They are indicative of the modern problem of enclaves, created by the modern Law of the Sea with associated problems of "territorialization of the oceans" and "creeping jurisdiction", [Ref. 116].

The problems associated with enclaves can escalate easily as a point of continual animosity. They can intensify until significant conflict exists. Historical background fills in some of the answers to why something of little apparent value stirs the emotions.

The Bertram and Holst book, New Strategic Factors for the North Atlantic, includes a discussion of a Soviet strategy for neutralization of the North Atlantic islands, including Jan Mayen, Iceland, Greenland, the Faeroes, and Svalbard, each of which is discussed in this context of outlying strategic territories, [Ref. 117]. Further south in the Atlantic, the Soviets have shown more than passing interest in the Cape Verde Islands, and as mentioned above, the Canaries. Any Soviet chokepoint strategy could make good use of access to Ceuta or the Melilla/Chafarinas Islands area as well.

The preceding discussion, supported by selections from Bertram and Holst suggest that International Law and Law of the Sea must be considered in the operational planning, and the strategic thinking processes. D. P. O'Connell brings out in the Bertram and Holst book that Law of the

Sea, even though it is overtaken by the events of war, is significant in the escalation process as a source of conflict, [Ref. 118].

Although the encircled enclaves of the past have all but disappeared, the modern enclaves, i.e., islands and points of land closer to the territory or territorial sea of a foreign country, will no doubt continue as a factor that could present both challenges to Western Alliance cohesion, and opportunities to the Soviets.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

A. THE FIVE SPANISH ENCLAVES

It is easy to see the similarities among the Spanish North African enclaves. They are similar overall in terms of sovereignty and continental location. Ceuta and Melilla are similar because they have large civilian populations and are major ports. The minor places are all similar in that they are nothing more than military garrisons and a burden for Spain to occupy. Spain continues to hold them as a matter of principle. If Spain relinquishes one, the others could be expected eventually to follow like dominoes.

Each of the five enclaves is different in its own way, either by its location on the coast in relation to the Moroccan hinterland, its location in relation to Spain, or by its date and circumstance of acquisition. If one had to assess the relative value of each of the five, Ceuta would have to be considered the prize. The Peñon de Velez is probably the least accessible by land, and therefore, the least valuable because of its lack of hinterland resources and communication. In principle, Velez could be grouped with the two major enclaves because of its date of acquisition in 1507. Spain acquired the Chafarinas Islands in the 1800's and, therefore, those islands are the only places of sovereignty which date from the 19th century age of imperialism. The Spanish presence in Chafarinas seems least justifiable if date of acquisition is the only consideration. If any of the enclaves were to be relinquished, this likely would be the first, since it was the

last acquired. The Spaniards assert, however, that when they occupied Chafarinas, the islands were deserted, uninhabited, and under no other sovereignty. Their value to either Spain or Morocco is questionable. However, the past reputation as an excellent natural anchorage for large ships gives it some naval significance. It would be a good Western Mediterranean anchorage, and consequently could be of value to the Soviet Navy which uses anchorages more than port facilities in the Mediterranean. It could be used to augment the Melilla anchorage, and provide protection from winds and weather.

Alhucemas, with a date of acquisition in 1673, is the enclave where conflict potential is the greatest, because of national pride. Land communications to the surrounding Moroccan area are good. Air communications to the Moroccan civil airfield near Al Hoceima are good. Alhucemas Island's location, less than one mile off the Moroccan shore opposite Morocco's largest Club Med, could hinder development of tourism in the bay area. Alhucemas Island is not absolutely required, however, for Morocco to develop the bay for tourism. At the very most, the small island is seen as a Moroccan embarrassment by foreign visitors who view the Spanish fortress within the Moroccan bay. The hinterland is a rich valley, and there is a small, but good quality, beach and shoreline. The Alhucemas Bay (Ajdir Bay) area is one that the Moroccan Government is trying to develop for tourism. Because of its ease of access by Moroccans, both civilian and military, and its limited Spanish defenses (less than 100 men), it is the most vulnerable of the enclaves. On the other hand, foreign tourists frequent the area and incidents here likely would cause more bad publicity than the Moroccan tourist trade

would like to have. The monolithic Spanish fortress in the bay, maintained with little Spanish fanfare, is an accomodation which easily can be accepted by Morocco as the Moroccan Government works on more pressing problems. Alhucemas Island is of little value to Spain. However, if it were relinquished to Morocco, both countries would likely view it as the first domino to fall. Consequently, it could be pivotal in the plans of either country, either in terms of Spanish defense or of Moroccan irredentism.

Melilla is no longer a real prize for Spain. Spain does not tap the resources of the iron mines to the south. Its significance is great for the military of Spain, especially the Army which has had to plan and execute its defense. Melilla was the first to rise against the Republican democracy at the beginning of the Civil War. Franco's statue is displayed proudly just outside the port facility. Because Spain's position in Melilla is somewhat less tenable than in Ceuta, and because of the importance of Melilla to the Moroccans as a deep water port for hinterland development, the existence of the Moroccan breakwater at Melilla is of great importance. Morocco receives the deep water port it needs by use of the south breakwater facility which it continues to expand. Morocco can develop its resources freely to the south, with the realization that deep draft ships can use Melilla. This compromise works in Spain's favor because it reduces tensions with Morocco. The compromise gives Spain time to solidify its internal political situation with regard to democracy and the Spanish military. The exact time that Morocco gained access to the south breakwater is not known, but it was within three years of the 1975 enclave incidents. The agreement on Moroccan use could have come from talks conducted during that time.

Ceuta is the strategically-located prize for both Spain and Morocco. A poor man's Gibraltar, it still is a significant port and fortress. It is of great symbolic value to both countries. The Spanish enclaves situation is much more similar to the Greek-Turkish situation than to the Gibraltar situation as Morocco asserts, making it a much more complex problem. For Spain, it symbolizes the first time that the Iberians successfully took the war across the straits during the reconquest. Its loss would be more grave to the Spanish psyche than any of the rest of the enclaves. It would be the last domino to fall. For Morocco, a return of Ceuta would be the final expulsion of European domination. Practically-speaking, however, Ceuta is not critical to Morocco. Tangier is a major port only 25 miles away. If the Moroccan Government were serious about Riff development, Tangier, Al Hoceima, and Nador would have been linked by regular ferry and air service. The conditions of neglect in the Riff have often been blamed on the Spanish, when in fact, the Riff has been neglected by Morocco because Rabat places a low priority on the area, and on the staunchly independent Berbers that live there.

If all the enclaves were to go to Morocco, unification would be complete only until Moroccan irredentists decided that the Canaries should become part of Africa, or until Moroccans decided to move east and south to reunite all the traditional Kingdom of Morocco which lies in Algeria and Mauritania. Spain apparently would prefer to have Melilla and the minor enclaves as bargaining chips than have any serious problems raised in Ceuta or the Canaries. Any compromises made in Melilla, the special wage differential for some professions to work and live there, and the tenacity with which Spain maintains troops on

isolated, desolate pieces of nonproductive rock, all are evidence attesting to this preference. Very few, if any, Spaniards would consider giving up the Canary Islands.

B. SPANISH AND MOROCCAN STABILITY

Spain has made great strides both since the Civil War in 1939, and in the post-Franco era since 1976. Its democracy is continuing to develop and strengthen. During 1981 and 1982, significant Army displeasure over new systems continued to surface. Spain is a country trying to reach the ten-year mark as a democracy, and to move beyond that first difficult decade. The integration of Spain's military into NATO moves slowly forward. The give-and-take of the integration process must proceed at a rate that encourages mutual participation by all three services: Navy, Air Force, and Army. Spain should be given preferential treatment by NATO if the alliance expects to utilize Spain to its greatest advantage as a member of the NATO team. EEC membership would aid significantly in Spain's rapid integration into mainstream Europe.

Spain works against the clock, however, as the new Socialist Government shows its ability to help solve problems. Major setbacks could again excite the politically-minded colonels. If Morocco were to press the enclaves issue before the completion of Spain's first decade of democracy, or before Spain's integration into NATO is complete, the effects would be disastrous. Democratic development and NATO integration are important both for Spain, and for its European allies. The true test of Spanish stability could be in the early 1990's when, as a power integrated into the European mainstream, Spain could make lasting concessions with its southern neighbor.

Morocco is still a young country in the modern world. Moroccans have moved from one irredentist issue to another during the short period since independence in 1956. The country has advanced, but it has a long way to go. King Hassan is a very capable leader who has used irredentist claims to unite his people. A concentration on consolidation, development and internal progress for the Moroccan people would aid greatly in Moroccan stability. Unfortunately, a leader of Hassan's talent does not appear to be present to take over. U.S. and European cooperation with Morocco must expand to include more institutional relationships, not just those at the head of state and military levels. If there is neglect in this area, the United States and the West are courting disaster with their support of a man instead of a country. The United States must not let King Hassan down, but by the absence of expanded institutional ties, the King and post-Hassan Morocco will most assuredly be undermined.

Spain-watchers are looking north, at Spain's democratic development, the Socialists, the military, terrorism, NATO roles and missions, and Spanish integration into mainstream Europe. Morocco-watchers are looking south at the war in the Sahara, economic development around Casablanca and Rabat, the expanding phosphate industry, and the strength of pro-Western Arab leader King Hassan. One of the ironies of the enclaves situation at the important strait is that developments there could catch Spain-watchers and Morocco-watchers offguard while their attentions are aimed in the opposite direction.

There is an additional irony whose consequences potentially are more grave for the United States and NATO. The enclave situations on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar represent a no-win situation for the

Allies. Whether it is Gibraltar or Ceuta, one of them will smite NATO. If there is no change in the status of Gibraltar under the NATO framework, it could halt the integration of Spain's military into NATO. The long discussed NATO referendum could become a reality, as the Socialists have suggested, and British intransigence over Gibraltar would receive very bad press in Spain. Under the NATO framework, Spaniards expect Gibraltar's status to change. The results of the referendum could be disastrous for the alliance, and for Spain as it tries to depoliticize the Army.

The other side of the no-win situation is that if Gibraltar is returned to Spain, the Moroccans expect a change in the status of the Spanish enclaves. Either way, regional stability is adversely affected reducing the Western advantage and producing Soviet opportunities because of the instability produced. The similarity of the Spanish-Moroccan situation to the Greek-Turkish territorial situation is striking. None of the alternatives are acceptable to all parties, and the situation therefore remains potentially explosive and destabilizing.

C. SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES

If North Africa is of importance to the Soviet Union, then Morocco and the Strait of Gibraltar are as well. Although Morocco has declared itself pro-Western, it has nonetheless kept the door open with the Warsaw Pact countries, including the Soviet Union. The presence of engineers and professors from nearly every eastern bloc country attests to this openness. Morocco's interests now lie with the West, but the Soviet realignment in the Horn of Africa and the special Peruvian

relationship with the Communist bloc could serve as models for a similar potential Moroccan situation.

In the late 1990's, a stable Morocco could seriously negotiate on the enclaves. In the 1980's, however, both Morocco and Spain have too little to gain, and too much peripherally to lose if Morocco were to press the enclaves issue. The sensitive nature of the situation during the remainder of the decade of the 1980's presents unusual opportunities for Soviet exploitation, and unusual problems for Spain, Morocco, and their common friend, the United States.

The United States and the West can do nothing less than have a complete knowledge of the enclaves situation which involves these two countries and their interaction. The exclusion of the enclaves from the NATO treaty sends a signal to the Soviets of a target of opportunity. A stirring of emotions on either side of the strait by Soviet propagandists could occur over either Gibraltar or the Spanish enclaves. The United States' desire to remain neutral would hurt relations with both countries. In the event of conflict, U.S. arms would be employed to a large extent. Contrast U.S. support to Britain over the Falklands, south of the Tropic of Cancer, and clearly outside of NATO, to any position other than pro-Spanish. Prior to Spain's NATO integration and its first decade of democracy, the U.S. would have to side with Spain over the issue of the Places of Sovereignty. To do anything else would undercut Spain's democratic growth, European solidarity, and alliance cohesion. The Soviets would then side with Morocco and polarize the situation further. The crowded Strait of Gibraltar is no place for a war.

The United States and NATO should send strong signals of support for Spain in NATO, and for its further integration with the European democracies. A clear understanding of all aspects of the enclave issues and analogous situations must be developed to avoid policies which could adversely affect Spanish democracy or the Spanish assumption of its NATO role. Spanish presence in all the enclaves sends clear signals of resolve to the Moroccans, and contributes to stability. Spain has compromised where it could in the interest of both countries. No major movement should be made by Spain that would raise the expectations of Moroccan irredentists until possibly the 1990's. The Spanish paranoia which is demonstrated by the maintenance of troops on the rocks at Velez and Alhucemas may have subsided by that time. Spanish democracy and NATO membership will be on firm ground, and by then a better assessment of Moroccan growth and stability can be made.

Until that time, the enclaves, especially Melilla and the minor places, will represent an anomaly, an irritant, and an anathema with significant potential for European problems and Soviet opportunities at the Strait of Gibraltar.

APPENDIX A

SELECTED MINERAL RESOURCE COMPARISONS OF SPAIN AND MOROCCO
(All figures are for 1979 unless otherwise indicated)

MINERAL	SPAIN	MOROCCO
Phosphate	-	20,030,000 t
Iron Ore	8,827,000 t	61,700 t
Lead	72,000 t	165,000 t
Cobalt Ore	-	8,000 t
Zinc	143,000 t	12,900 t
Manganese Ore	-	135,700 t
Silver	-	30,700 t
Anthracite	3,796,000 t	Included with coal
Coal	8,049,000 t	710,000 t Includes Anthracite
Lignite	10,696,000 t	-
Copper Concentrate	36,000 t	23,500 t
Tin Ore (Paxton, p. 1108)	1,100 t (1978)	-
Wolfram Ore "	600 t "	-
Crude Oil (Paxton, p. 895)	-	18,600 t
Potash	8,827,000 t	-

Source: For Spain, The Europa Yearbook, p. 1080; For Morocco, The Middle East and North Africa, p. 621; Paxton where indicated.

APPENDIX B

WORLD ENCLAVES AND TERRITORIES SEPARATED FROM THE TRADITIONAL MAINLAND OF THE MOTHER COUNTRY

1. Argentine Tierra del Fuego.
- * 2. West Berlin.
3. Bornholm Island--closer to other countries (Sweden, Poland and East Germany) than to mainland Denmark.
4. Canary Islands--geographically an African archipelago, ethnically European.
5. Cayman Islands--closer to Cuba and Jamaica than to Britain.
- * 6. Ceuta, Melilla, and the minor places.
7. Channel Islands--closer to France than Britain, more French influence than British in some cases; they are personal feudal fiefs of the Queen.
8. Corsica--Ethno-geographic enclave; ethnically more similar to Italy than France; geographically closer to Italy.
9. Cyprus--Ethno-geographic enclave; more Greek Cypriots than Turkish Cypriots; closer to Turkey geographically.
10. Falkland Islands--closer proximity to Argentina than to Britain; on same continental shelf extension as Argentine coastal area.
11. Faeroe Islands--closer to Britain than to Denmark.
- *12. Gibraltar.
13. Goa--enclave of the past.
- *14. Greek Islands off Turkey.
- *15. Guantanamo.
- *16. Hong Kong.
17. Israel--Ethno-geographic enclave.
- *18. Macao.
19. Memel, Danzig, Prussia--past enclaves.
20. Northern Ireland--Ethno-geographical-religious enclave.
- *21. St. Pierre, Miquelon--closer to Canada than to France, major commercial ties with Canada.
- *22. Taiwan's Quemoy and Matsu.
23. Turkey in Europe.
- *24. Walvis Bay.
25. Zara--past enclave.

*Those in the list above annotated with an asterisk are bonefide enclaves of today. Many of the others are either enclaves of the recent past, territories which bear similarities to some enclave situations, or ethno-geographical curiosities where one ethnic group lives as a minority surrounded by hostile neighbors.

This list is by no means meant to be exhaustive or all inclusive. It is rather for illustrative purposes. It leaves out such enclaves as Llivia, a Spanish town in France, and San Marino, a country enclave in Italy.

	West Berlin	Ceuta Melilla Minor Places	Walvis Bay	Gibraltar	Guantanamo	Hong Kong	Greece/Turkey (Coastal Islands) (Turkey in Europe) (Cyprus)
Preliminary Questions:							
A. Superpower interest?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes
B. Geo-strategic position?	Yes	Yes (distance)	Yes (distance)	Yes (Cuba)	Yes (mutual benefit)	-	Yes
C. Special Circumstances?	Yes	Spain	UK	US	UK	Turkey	
D. Mother Country (X)	FRG	Spain	South Africa	Cuba	China	Greece	
E. Enclaving Country (Y)	GDR	Morocco	Namibia	Cuba	Yes	Yes	
F. State of Relations a factor	Yes						
Location							
Proximity	X--100 miles	X--9 to 120 miles	X--800 miles	X--450 miles	X--4,000 miles		
Contiguity	Y--contiguous	Y--less than 5 mi	Y--contiguous	Y--contiguous	Y--contiguous		
Area (sq. mi.)	188	14	434	2.5	410		
Population (numbers)	1,900,000	125,000	30,000	30,000	5,100,000		
Demography							
Ethnic Considerations	German	Spanish	Genoese, Maltese, Portuguese, Spanish	Portuguese, Spanish	mostly Chinese		
Language	Roman Catholic/Huguenot	Roman Catholic/Huguenot	Mostly Roman Catholic	Mostly Roman Catholic			
Religion							
Relation w/each country	Mall	Open border	1704	1704	1898	1841	Various
Date of Acquisition	1715; 1797; 1848; 1910		X--278 years ⁵	X--278 years ⁵			
Time as part of ea country			Y--242 yrs (1462-1704)				
Conflict/Last Major War/Peace/Debate							
Defenses/number of troops		19,000					
Economy/Resources		Port/Fishing/Trade					
Industry		None					
Commerce w/each country		Smuggling claim by Morocco					
X GNP							
\$ Imports/Exports		Free Ports	56:19 Ratio	By Treaty	By Treaty		
Miscellaneous		Ceuta Pop.----67,000 Melilla Pop.---58,000 Minor Places-- 330	111 Chinese Newspapers 4 English Newspapers				
		By Treaty					

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originally was published in French in 1975. The English edition was published in 1976, and compares the Spanish enclaves situation to that of Gibraltar. The final conclusion reached by Rezette is that it is the same problem. The author displays a heavy bias in favor of the Moroccan position. In fact, he is so skillful in presenting the Moroccan case that the Moroccan Embassy in Washington, D.C. distributes the book in English, free of charge. Although the book is an excellent compendium of information on a little known area of the world, it does suffer from some fairly significant shortcomings. Most of the information was compiled during the early 1970's, and in the ten years which has elapsed, significant compromises have been made by both sides. For example, Melilla harbor has been shared by both Spain and Morocco since about 1979. The Rezette book was written before the 1975 period of tension between Spain and Morocco over Spanish Sahara was settled. Since the publication of the book, Spain has become a democracy and a member of NATO. Many of the figures are dated. A number of the facts he presents are either distorted or incorrect. The book's strong points are its maps, its historical data, and its attempts to deal thoroughly with a fairly obscure subject. Spaniards would do well to have such a book written and translated into English and other languages, displaying a Spanish bias should they ever have to argue their case before the U.N. or the World Court.

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